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LESSONS FROM A STORY UNTOLD:
NIKE V. KASKY RECONSIDERED
David C. Vladeckt
INTRODUCTION-A STORY UNTOLD
The Supreme Court's recent dismissal, apparently on jurisdic-
tional grounds,' of the writ of certiorari it had granted to review
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky has brought into sharp focus a number of cri-
tiques of the commercial speech doctrine-some new, some long-
standing. At issue in Nike were communications Nike made to
customers, newspaper editors, college presidents and athletic di-
rectors, and others responding to allegations that Nike had engaged
in, or was complicit in, the mistreatment of foreign workers. Re-
spondent Marc Kasky contended that Nike's communications con-
tained significant misstatements of fact and thus were actionable
t Associate Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Public Representation, George-
town University Law Center. In the interest of full disclosure, as an attorney with Public Citi-
zen Litigation Group, a public interest law firm, I have participated as counsel for parties on
both sides of commercial speech cases. I represented parties opposing restraints on commercial
speech in a number of the cases discussed in this article, including Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S.
761 (1993), and was co-counsel in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626
(1985). I also submitted amici briefs in cases supporting speech restraints, including Nike, Inc.
v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) and Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
Public Citizen Litigation Group also represented the plaintiffs in Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and submitted amici
briefs in many of the commercial speech cases discussed in this article. My former colleague
Alan B. Morrison has recounted the history of some of these cases in his contribution to this
symposium. See Alan B. Morrison, How We Got The Commercial Speech Doctrine: An
Originalist's Recollections, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1189 (2004).
1 I say "apparently" because the Court's per curiam order states only that "[tihe writ of
certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted." Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2554 (2003). Justice Ste-
vens's separate opinion explains his view that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the judg-
ment of remand entered by the California Supreme Court was not "final" under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 (2000) and that neither party to the case had Article III standing to invoke the jurisdic-
tion of a federal court. Id. at 2556-58. Justice Stevens also suggested that dismissal was war-
ranted because "the reasons for avoiding the premature adjudication of novel constitutional
questions apply with special force to this case." Id. at 2555.
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under California's unfair competition and false advertising laws.2
Nike countered that, even if it had made factual misstatements, its
communications were part of an ongoing public debate about the
labor practices of multinational corporations generally and, for that
reason, they were fully protected under the First Amendment.3 A
sharply divided California Supreme Court rejected Nike's theory,4
but the United States Supreme Court agreed to review Nike's First
Amendment claim. After full briefing and argument, a divided
Court dismissed the writ as improvidently granted, much to the
disappointment of Nike and its supporters who had forecast a Nike
victory.5
2 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 (concerning unfair competition), 17500-
17594 (proscribing false advertising) (West 2000). Although Kasky's initial complaint identi-
fied a large number of contested statements, his First Amended Complaint narrowed the focus
of the litigation to six statements by Nike that Kasky alleged to be false: (1) that Nike's "prod-
ucts are manufactured in compliance with applicable local laws and regulations governing
wages and working hours," (2) that "the average line-workers in the factories are paid double
the applicable local minimum wage," (3) that "the workers receive free meals and health care,"
(4) that Nike "guarantee[s] a living wage for all workers," (5) that "the workers are protected
from corporal punishment and abuse," and (6) that "working conditions in the factories are in
compliance with applicable local laws and regulations governing occupational health-and-
safety." Brief for Respondent Kasky at 3-4, Nike (No. 02-575) (citing Plaintiffs First Amended
Complaint at U 75, 79, 82(b) and 84). As Kasky explained, these allegations were based on a
number of sources, including "studies and reports issued by human-rights groups," news reports,
and, perhaps most importantly, an Ernst & Young "Report on Environmental and Labor Prac-
tices Audit" prepared for Nike but eventually "leaked to the public." Id. at 3.
3 Nike characterized the question presented as follows:
When a corporation participates in a public debate-writing letters to newspaper editors
and to educators and publishing communications addressed to the general public on issues
of great political, social, and economic importance-may it be subjected to liability for
factual inaccuracies on the theory that its statements are 'commercial speech' because
they might affect consumers' opinions about the business as a good corporate citizen and
thereby affect their purchasing decisions?
Brief for the Petitioners Nike, Inc., et. al. at (i), Nike (No. 02-575). Not surprisingly, Kasky
framed the issue quite differently: "Whether Nike's factual representations about the conditions
under which its products are made, as alleged in the complaint, are commercial speech subject
to laws regulating false or misleading commercial messages." Brief for Respondent at (i), Nike
(No. 02-575).
4 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. denied, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S.
Ct. 2554 (2003).
5 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Nike and the Free-Speech Knot, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2003,
at A16, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3972562 (stating that many expected the U.S. Supreme
Court to overturn the California Supreme Court's holding that Nike's statements were commer-
cial speech).
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Although Nike will not return to the Supreme Court,6 the case
plainly piqued the Court's interest, so much so that the Court is
likely to look for another case presenting similar issues. After all,
the opinion of Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Jus-
tice Souter in part, cites "the importance of the difficult First
Amendment questions raised in this case" as a reason not to reach
the merits in the absence of a fuller factual record.7 Justice
Breyer's dissent, joined by Justice O'Connor, notes that "the ques-
tions presented directly concern the freedom of Americans to
speak about public matters in public debate" and suggests that,
were the Court to review a Nike-like case in the future, he would
urge the Court to "apply a form of heightened scrutiny to the
speech regulations in question" under which "those regulations
cannot survive." 8  Justice Kennedy also dissented from the dis-
missal, signaling that he too wanted to resolve the case on its mer-
its.9
The business community also is anxious for another opportu-
nity to persuade the Court to dismantle the commercial speech
doctrine or at least limit the categories of expression that fall
within the doctrine. Of the thirty-one amicus briefs filed in Nike,
twenty-two were from Nike's supporters, mostly corporations or
business interests urging the Court to cut back on the scope of the
commercial speech doctrine or to scrap the doctrine altogether. 10
Thus, there will be no shortage of Nike-clones asking the Court to
"Just Do It" and reconsider the commercial speech doctrine.
6 Shortly after the case was remanded to the California Supreme Court, the parties en-
tered into a settlement, the terms of which went undisclosed, other than an acknowledgment by
the parties that Nike had paid $1.5 million dollars, not to Mr. Kasky, but to the Fair Labor Asso-
ciation, a Washington, D.C.-based organization that monitors labor practices abroad and helps
educate workers. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Nike Move Ends Case over Firms' Free Speech, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2003, at A8; David F. Pike, Activist Lawyer Questions Nike Pact on Labor:
Letters by Attorney Demand Whole Story, Details on Settlement, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 26, 2003,
at 7 Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2558 (Stevens, J., concurring).
8 Id. at 2560, 2565 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 2559 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
'0 Among the business organizations supporting Nike were the National Association of
Manufacturers, the Business Roundtable, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States,
ExxonMobil, Microsoft, Morgan Stanley, GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, and forty media organiza-
tions (including ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The
Seattle Times, and National Public Radio). Nike also had the support, among others, of the
United States and the AFL-CIO (although its brief was nominally filed in support of neither
party, it sought reversal of the California Supreme Court's judgment in the case).
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I. WHY NIKE? A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
On one level, the controversy surrounding Nike v. Kasky is not
surprising. Even prior to Nike, deep fissures in the Court's com-
mercial speech doctrine had become evident, although not for the
precise reasons raised in Nike. Eight years earlier, in 44 Liquor-
mart, Inc. v. Rhode Island," four Justices explicitly called for the
reformulation of the doctrine in cases where the government im-
posed a categorical ban on the dissemination of truthful informa-
tion about a lawful product. 12 These Justices argued that restraints
on truthful commercial speech that keep consumers "in the dark"
about lawful goods and services should come before the Court
with a burden of justification approaching, if not reaching, strict
scrutiny review.1 3  Since 44 Liquormart, the Court has made it
clear that it would be willing to revisit the doctrine should the ap-
propriate case come along.
14
Nor is the Court's dissatisfaction with the commercial speech
doctrine new. The Court's opening chapter of the doctrine-its
1976 landmark decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council'5-provoked a strong dissent
by then-Justice Rehnquist.16 Few of the early commercial speech
517 U.S. 484 (1996).
2 Id. at 501-04 (Stevens, J., concurring, along with Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ.), 526-28
(Thomas, J., concurring).
13 Id. at 503 (Stevens, J., concurring), 523 (Thomas, J., concurring).
14 See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 & n.3
(1999) (stating that while many scholars, judges, and amici curiae have advocated the repudia-
tion of the Central Hudson test, the Court would not make such a broad pronouncement when
the case at hand could be resolved without doing so).
'" 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
16 Id. at 781. Justice Rehnquist challenged the Court's idea that purely commercial expres-
sion falls within the protective sphere of the First Amendment, remarking that to the extent that
the primary purpose of the First Amendment is "to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democ-
racy," that purpose "relate[s] to public decisionmaking as to political, social, and other public
issues, rather than the decision of a particular individual as to whether to purchase one or an-
other kind of shampoo." Id. at 787. With considerable foresight, Justice Rehnquist predicted
that the Court's ruling would pave the way for direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription
drugs, and forecast, among other things, that an enterprising pharmacist might run an advertise-
ment that stated: "Don't spend another sleepless night. Ask your doctor to prescribe Seconal
without delay." Id. at 788. Justice Rehnquist warned that
[u]nless the State can show that these advertisements are either actually untruthful or
misleading, it presumably is not free to restrict... commercial efforts on the part of
those who profit from the sale of prescription drugs to put them in the widest possi-
ble circulation. But such a line simply makes no allowance whatever for.., a con-
sidered legislative judgment in most States that while prescription drugs are a neces-
sary and vital part of medical care and treatment, there are sufficient dangers attend-
ing their widespread use that they simply may not be promoted in the same manner
as hair creams, deodorants, and toothpaste.
Id. The FDA has decided to permit the type of advertising decried by Justice Rehnquist because
it believes it is compelled to do so by the First Amendment. Using FDA-Approved Patient
[Vol. 54:4
LESSONS FROM A STORY UNTOLD
cases were unanimous.17 The Court's first attempt to formulate an
enduring legal standard to evaluate restraints on commercial
speech-Justice Powell's 1980 opinion in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York' 8-
mustered the support of only five Justices and provoked a fire-
storm of academic criticism.' 9 Justice Blackmun, the author of
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, complained that "the test now
evolved and applied by the Court is not consistent with our prior
cases and does not provide adequate protection for truthful, non-
misleading, noncoercive commercial speech. 2° Justice Stevens, in
Labeling in Consumer-Directed Print Advertisements, 66 Fed. Reg. 20468 (Apr. 23, 2001). The
FDA has recently announced that it will permit food and dietary supplement manufacturers to
make claims that their products prevent, treat, or cure diseases, even where the scientific evi-
dence supporting the claim is unreliable or inconclusive, on the theory that the First Amendment
compels the agency to allow these claims, so long as they are accompanied by an appropriate
disclaimer. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Food Labeling: Health Claims; Die-
tary Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. 66040 (Nov. 25, 2003); see also Guidance for Industry and FDA:
Interim Evidence-Based Ranking System for Scientific Data; Interim Procedures for Health
Claims on the Labeling of Conventional Human Food and Human Dietary Supplements, 68 Fed.
Reg. 41387 (July 11, 2003) (providing guidelines for properly labeling food and supplements
within regulations).
17 Of the cases the Court decided in the first five years following Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy, only two, Linmark Associations, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) and Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), were decided by a unanimous Court. Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) was five-to-four on the First Amendment question; In
re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) was seven-to-one on the First Amendment question (Justice
Brennan did not participate); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) was seven-to-two on the
First Amendment question; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S.
530 (1980) was seven-to-two on the First Amendment question; and Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), was eight-to-one on the First
Amendment question. It was not until the Court's unanimous ruling in Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983), that Justice Rehnquist was willing to join the Court in
striking down a statute on commercial speech grounds. Justice Rehnquist did not participate in
Linmark Associates, which might explain why it was unanimous.
"8 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
19 Central Hudson established the now-familiar four-part test for evaluating the constitu-
tionality of restrictions on commercial speech. The test's inquiry proceeds as follows: (1)
whether the speech concerns a lawful activity; if not, it may be suppressed outright; (2) whether
the asserted governmental interest is substantial; (3) whether the regulation directly advances
the asserted governmental interest; and (4) whether the regulation is more extensive than neces-
sary. Id. at 563-66. The Central Hudson test has been the subject of intense academic criticism.
See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism and Collective Choice, 56 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1317, 1374-75 (1988) (stating that the Court further complicated the commercial
speech test in Central Hudson); Alex Kozinksi & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial
Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 631, 641-50 (1990) (stating that courts were unsure what type of
regulation Central Hudson's four-part test permitted); Matthew L. Miller, Note, The First
Amendment and Legislative Bans of Liquor and Cigarette Advertisements, 85 CoLUM. L. REV.
632, 633-35 (1985) (noting the difficulty courts had in applying the Central Hudson commercial
speech test); Brian J. Waters, Comment, A Doctrine in Disarray: Why the First Amendment
Demands the Abandonment of the Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech, 27 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1626, 1628 (1997) (noting courts' inconsistent application and results of the test for
commercial speech); Jonathan Weinberg, Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial
Speech, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 720, 730 (1982) (arguing that Central Husdon created a shifting
rule that resulted in mere ad hoc adjudication).
20 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackman, J., concurring).
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his concurrence, argued that the Court's effort to formulate a
catch-all test for commercial speech was misguided and that the
speech at issue in Central Hudson-Central Hudson's promotion
of "off-peak" pricing to consumers-concerned important eco-
nomic matters and thus was entitled to rigorous First Amendment
protection. 21 In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued against con-
stitutionalizing speech unrelated to political or social discourse
and accused the Court of "return[ing] to the bygone era of Lochner
v. New York, in which it was common practice for this Court to
strike down economic regulations adopted by a State based on the
Court's own notions of the most apropriate means for the State to
implement its considered policies.
The chorus of criticism of the Central Hudson test only deep-
ened in 1986 with the Court's five-to-four decision in Posadas de
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 3 upholding
the constitutionality of a Puerto Rican law forbidding the advertis-
ing of casino gambling to residents of Puerto Rico, but not to visi-
tors. In so ruling, the Court deferred uncritically to the judgment
of the Puerto Rican legislature that local residents could ill afford
to lose their hard-earned dollars at gaming tables and that casino
gambling "would produce serious harmful effects on the health,
safety and welfare of the Puerto Rican citizens, such as the disrup-
tion of moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the
fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption, and the
infiltration of organized crime." 24 The Posadas Court's unques-
tioning acceptance of the dire legislative judgment underlying the
restraint was seen by many as an effort to wipe away the gains
made in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and Central Hudson
and return the Court to the era when it permitted commercial
speech to be suppressed for transparently paternalistic reasons.25
21 Id. at 579-81 (Stevens, J., concurring).
22 Id. at 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
23 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
24 Id. at 341.
' One feature of Justice Rehnquist's Posadas opinion drew especially withering criticism.
Justice Rehnquist asserted that because Puerto Rico had the power to ban casino gambling alto-
gether, it necessarily had the "lesser" power to ban casino advertising in Puerto Rico. Id. at 346.
As Justice Rehnquist put it:
It would just as surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to
the legislature the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legis-
lature the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity
through advertising on behalf of those who would profit from such increased de-
mand.
Id. The two dissenting opinions challenged Justice Rehnquist's assertion that a ban on casino
gambling is "less intrusive" of First Amendment rights than an outright prohibition on the activ-
ity itself and maintained that Rehnquist's "greater includes the lesser theory" threatened to
swallow the commercial speech doctrine whole. See id. at 348 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at
[Vol. 54:4
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The controversy that enveloped the early commercial speech
decisions has not abated. Since the doctrine was first announced,
it has been subject to two related strands of criticism by those who
believe that it affords inadequate protection to commercial expres-
sion-criticisms that formed the core of Nike's argument to the
Court.
The first objection goes to the standard's substance. This ar-
gument contends that the commercial speech doctrine should be
overhauled because it gives government too powerful a weapon to
suppress or control truthful commercial speech that it disfavors.
This argument does not challenge government's broad authority to
limit or even outlaw commercial speech that is false or misleading.
Rather, this criticism is that, having recognized that commercial
speech is entitled to First Amendment protection, the Court should
be far more rigorous in its review of government restraints on
truthful commercial speech, upholding only those restraints that
are narrowly tailored to further genuinely important governmental
interests. Many of these critics favor abandoning the commercial
speech doctrine altogether and evaluating restraints on truthful
commercial speech using the same strict scrutiny rules that apply
to other content-based restraints.26
This line of argument has had considerable influence on the
commercial speech doctrine's evolution. Although the commercial
speech doctrine has not been discarded, it has changed fundamen-
tally since Central Hudson was first announced. As articulated in
Central Hudson and applied in many of the cases that followed,
the early commercial speech doctrine was in a real sense an inter-
mediate standard of review, with courts giving considerable defer-
ence to legislative and administrative judgments that restraints on
speech-even truthful speech-were needed to further legitimate
governmental interests.27 Under this approach, the Court upheld a
359 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Phillip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism
Co.: "'Twos Strange, 'Twos Passing Strange, 'Twos Pitifid, 'Twas Wondrous Pitiful," 1986
Sup. CT. REV. 1, 12-15 (suggesting that Posadas may have been intended to enable the govern-
ment to restrict speech that may lead to immoral conduct); Burt Neubome, The First Amend-
ment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 29 n.78 (1989)
(calling Posadas "unfortunate" and noting that it "comes close to endorsing information ma-
nipulation as a tool for government attempts to control behavior").
26 See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 651-52 (arguing that speech, commer-
cial or not, should be treated as such, and only an important government interest justifies gov-
ernmental regulation); cf Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591,
634-35 (1982) (arguing that the distinctions between commercial and other forms of expression
are unjustified beyond regulation of false and misleading advertising).
27 Three cases, Posadas, Board of Trustees v. Fox, and United States v. Edge Broadcast-
ing Co., seem to be the high-water mark in terms of the Court's deference to legislative judg-
ments. In Fox, the Court rejected the argument that the government in commercial speech cases
had to meet a "least restrictive means" standard. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-77
10552004]
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number of government-imposed restraints on commercial speech.28
But the Court's deference was not unbounded. Restraints that
swept too broadly or that were imposed for less-than-substantial
reasons, such as economic protectionism (e.g., dampening compe-
tition for professional services) or paternalistic social engineering
(e.g., keeping the public away from disfavored or "sinful" products
like alcohol, tobacco, contraceptives, and gambling), were subject
to invalidation. 9
That standard, however, did not endure. The first recalibra-
tion of the standard came in 1993 in Edenfield v. Fane,30 where
Justice Kennedy, writing for a nearly unanimous Court,3' gave
teeth to Central Hudson's third prong, namely the requirement that
a regulation of commercial speech must directly serve a govern-
mental interest. In language not before seen in commercial speech
cases, the Edenfield Court emphasized that it is not enough for the
government simply to point to a substantial governmental interest;
the government also bears the burden of demonstrating that the
restriction furthers the interest "in a direct and material way. 32
The government's burden cannot be met by "mere speculation or
conjecture. 33 Rather, the government "must demonstrate that the
(1989). As the Court put it:
What our decisions require is a "fit" between the legislature's ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends ... a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reason-
able; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope
is "in proportion to the interest served" . . . that employs not necessarily the least re-
strictive means but... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.
Within those bounds we leave it to governmental decisionmakers to judge what
manner of regulation may best be employed.
Id. at 480 (citations omitted). As noted earlier, in Posadas, the Court accepted without serious
question the seemingly strained determination of the Puerto Rican legislature that permitting
casino advertising directed at Puerto Rican residents would lead to "the disruption of moral and
cultural patterns" and could therefore be banned. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341-42. And in Edge
Broadcasting, the Court resigned itself to Congress's judgment that it was necessary to ban
lottery broadcasting within states that do not sponsor lotteries, even where, as in Edge Broad-
casting, over ninety percent of the broadcaster's listeners resided in a state that sponsored lotter-
ies. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 428-29 (1993).
28 The cases that fall into this category are Florida Bar v. Wentfor It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618
(1995), Edge Broadcasting, Fox, Posadas, and Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
29 See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990)
(upholding a lawyer's right to advertise his or her specialty); Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (remand-
ing to determine whether restrictions imposed by the State University of New York on commer-
cial enterprises on campus were overbroad); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988)
(holding states may not categorically prohibit lawyers from advertising for business by sending
out truthful letters); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (partial
invalidation of regulation of attorney advertising); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60 (1983) (invalidating regulation of contraceptive advertising); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191
(1982) (striking down regulations on advertising by lawyers).
'0 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
31 Only Justice O'Connor dissented. Id. at 778 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
32 Id. at 767.
I3 d. at 770.
[Vol. 54:41056
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harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate
them to a material degree. 34 Without this requirement, the Court
stressed, "a State could with ease restrict commercial speech in the
service of other objectives that could not themselves justify a bur-
den on commercial expression."
35
The next modification came in 1996 in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, which drove home the Court's skepticism about pa-
ternalistic and anti-competitive bans on truthful commercial
speech, suggesting that they were ripe targets for invalidation.36
Although the Court unanimously held invalid a Rhode Island law
forbidding the advertising of the price of alcohol, the Court de-
voted fifty pages in U.S. Reports to wrangling over the correct
standard of review. The plurality opinion drew a line between
cases that should be addressed under Central Hudson and cases
that should be assessed under a more demanding standard of re-
view. "When a State regulates commercial messages to protect
consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales prac-
tices, or requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer informa-
tion, the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the reasons for
according constitutional protection to commercial speech and
therefore justifies less than strict review." 37  The opinion quickly
added, however, that "when a State entirely prohibits the dissemi-
nation of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons
unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is
far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First
Amendment generally demands., 38 This passage marked the first
time at least four Justices expressed a willingness to reconsider the
wisdom of Central Hudson in cases involving categorical bans on
truthful speech.39
m Id. at 771.
35 Id. Since Edenfield, the Supreme Court has ruled in the government's favor only
twice-in Edge Broadcasting, a case decided the same Term as Edenfield, and in Florida Bar,
which split the Court 5-to-4. The only other case that might arguably fall into this category is
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997), in which the Court rejected a
compelled speech challenge by fruit producers required to pay a fee for mandatory product
advertisements because the disputed regulations were found not to implicate free speech rights.
36 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
37 Id. at 501 (Stevens, J., along with Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ.).
38 Id. This point was echoed in Justice Thomas's concurrence, which explicitly called for
overruling Central Hudson in cases involving all-out bans on truthful speech. ld. at 518-26
(Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also made the point discussed in the text, namely that
the Court's opinions in 44 Liquormart made the Central Hudson test more demanding. As
Justice Thomas put it, "[b]oth Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor appear to adopt a stricter,
more categorical interpretation of the fourth prong of Central Hudson than that suggested in
some of our other opinions, one that could, as a practical matter, go a long way toward the posi-
tion I take." Id. at 524 (footnote omitted).
39 Id. at 501-04 (Stevens, J., concurring, along with Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ.), 518, 526-
2004] 1057
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The Court's 2001 five-to-four decision in Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly,40 which invalidated a Massachusetts regulation re-
stricting outdoor advertising of tobacco products to shield impres-
sionable minors, further altered the Central Hudson test. A major-
ity of the Justices had found that the regulations satisfied the third
part of the Central Hudson test by directly and materially advanc-
ing Massachusetts's interest in deterring tobacco usage by mi-
nors. 41  But a different majority of the Court concluded that the
regulations were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy Cen-
tral Hudson's fourth prong because the regulations would effec-
tively ban outdoor tobacco advertising in portions of the state's
urban areas. This holding is hard to square with the Court's earlier
rulings that the fourth prong required only a "reasonable fit" be-
tween the regulation and the problem it sought to address and that
significant overinclusiveness was not simply tolerated, but ex-
pected, in the regulation of commercial speech.42
The latest step in the reformulation of the Central Hudson test
came with the Court's most recent commercial speech decision-
its 2002 ruling in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,43
where the Court five-to-four struck down a federal law authorizing
pharmacists to "compound" drugs, but prohibiting pharmacists
from advertising that service. The law had been crafted to permit
pharmacists to compound specialty drugs needed by a handful of
patients and not generally available in the market. But Congress
was wary that pharmacies were not equipped to engage safely in
the mass compounding of drugs and thus wanted to ensure that
28 (Thomas, J., concurring). I say "at least" four Justices because Justice Scalia's concurrence
is opaque on whether he intended to join this block of Justices in calling for the overhaul of the
commercial speech doctrine. See id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring). 44 Liquormart is also nota-
ble because it formalized the Court's rejection of the "greater includes the lesser" theory ad-
vanced by the majority in Posadas, but not followed and largely discredited thereafter. Id. at
510-13 (rejecting the notion that a state may regulate commercial speech about a product simply
because a state may regulate that product itself).
40 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
41 Id. at 555-61.
42 Id. at 561-66; cf., e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 633 (1995) (recogniz-
ing that in the commercial speech area some degree of over-inclusiveness is acceptable); United
States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 432-34 (1993) (same); Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, 479 (1989) (emphasizing that a regulation will be set aside only when it is "substantially
excessive, disregarding far less restrictive and more precise means"). Indeed, only two years
earlier, in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States, the Court relied on Fox to
describe the requirement of Central Hudson's fourth prong: namely, that the government is not
required to use the least restrictive means, but must instead demonstrate "a fit that is not neces-
sarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one
whose scope is in proportion to the interest served." Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v.
United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999) (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 480).
4' 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
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pharmacy compounding was limited to special circumstances."4 In
ruling against the FDA, the majority discounted Congress's judg-
ment that public health imperatives justified the advertising re-
striction, finding that Congress would have to find non-speech
means to achieve its objective of limiting compounding activities
by pharmacies.'a Taken together, Lorillard and Western States
mark a sea change in the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence
because, in both cases, the Court was willing to place the free
speech rights of commercial speakers above public health interests
deemed by the Court to be valid and significant.
As is evident, in the span of less than two decades, the Court
has markedly transformed the Central Hudson test without doing
so explicitly. The Central Hudson test no longer gives deference
to government judgments or upholds restraints on commercial
speech as long as they are reasonable and proportionate to the in-
46terests served, as it did as recently as a decade ago. The Central
Hudson test the Court now employs is a demanding one-a stan-
dard so rigorous that it results in the virtually automatic invalida-
tion of laws restraining truthful commercial speech. I will call
this the "modern" commercial speech doctrine.
But even this "modern" doctrine does not strip the govern-
ment of all regulatory authority over commercial speech. While
the modern doctrine makes it far more difficult for government to
ban or strictly regulate commercial speech, it nonetheless retains
three central features of the early doctrine: (1) the government may
act to restrain but not ban truthful commercial speech where, but
only where, there are paramount interests of public welfare hang-
ing in the balance; (2) the government's power to restrain poten-
tially misleading or deceptive speech remains substantial; and (3)
the government may suppress outright false commercial speech.48
There is, for the moment anyway, no constitutional protection for
falsehoods in the realm of commercial speech.
4 id. at 363-66.
41 Id. at 375-76.
46 Fox, 492 U.S. at 479-80 (emphasizing that Central Hudson requires the government to
show only that there is a "reasonable fit" between the regulation and the interest it is designed to
serve).
47 See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 375-76 (2002) (stating that a
statute regulating expressive rights must directly advance a state interest); Lorillard Tobacco Co.
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556-62 (2001) (invalidating regulations promulgated by the Massachu-
setts Attorney General because, although the Court found ample evidence of problems posed by
smokeless tobacco and cigars, the regulations were not narrowly tailored to fit the ends of the
scheme).
48 See Western States, 535 U.S. at 367 (setting out the test for determining what commer-
cial speech may be suppressed).
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That brings us to the second strand of the argument against
the commercial speech doctrine, which attacks the breadth or the
domain of the doctrine. Critics contend that the doctrine should be
scrapped or limited because, in many cases, there is no meaningful
way to differentiate between commercial and noncommercial
speech.49 These critics argue that the test the Court has devised for
determining whether speech is commercial-namely, whether it
proposes a commercial transaction-is unworkable because often
the line between commercial speech on the one hand and artistic,
social, and political expression on the other is at best indistinct and
at worst illusory. ° These critics also point out that commercial
speech conveys important information, and, for that reason, a less-
protective standard of review should not be triggered merely by
labeling speech "commercial." In their view, a more particularized
and probing evaluation of the informational content of the com-
munication should precede a determination of the speech's status.
Judge Kozinksi and his law clerk Stewart Banner argued in an in-
fluential 1990 law review article that the doctrine should be dis-
carded because the definition is too easily manipulated and thus
"gives government a powerful weapon to suppress or control
speech by classifying it as merely commercial.'
Although this suppression-by-classification criticism of the
commercial speech doctrine played out extensively in the aca-
demic literature, it went essentially untested because most of the
cases before the Court involved classic advertising for goods or
services, and thus fell comfortably within the Court's commercial
speech definition. To be sure, there were a few cases in the early
1980s where the Court had to grapple with the definitional ques-
52tion. But those cases rejected arguments that the commercial
speech doctrine did not apply to communications made by corpora-
49 See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 652 (suggesting that the Court should
"abandon[] the commercial speech distinction"); Redish, supra note 26, at 634 (suggesting that
the commercial speech doctrine be limited to "consciously false or misleading assertions about
commercial products or services"); Steven Shriffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regu-
lation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212, 1222-23
(1984) (describing the difficulty the Court has had in trying to define the various forms of
speech).
50 Shiffrin, supra note 51, at 1222-23.
5' Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 653.
52 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989) (holding that the inclusion of
noncommercial speech in commercial speech does not automatically render protection to the
commercial speech); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-68 (1983) (noting
that some of the informational material at issue in the case did not readily fit into the category of
commercial speech as the Court had previously defined it but nevertheless holding the pam-
phlets were commercial speech); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S 557, 562-64 (1980) (noting that protection afforded commercial speech depends on the
nature of the speech and the government's interest in regulating that speech).
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tions about their products to consumers, even where the communi-
cations also addressed political and social matters. Over time, the
criticism going to the breadth of the commercial speech doctrine
died down. That is, until April 1998, when Marc Kasky sued the
Nike Corporation for misrepresenting the facts about Nike's treat-
ment of its foreign workforce.
II. NIKE V. KASKY-A NEW FRONT IN THE BATTLE
OVER THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
Nike v. Kasky provided corporations and others intent on ex-
panding constitutional protection for commercial speech an oppor-
tunity to open new fronts in their battle against both the substance
and the reach of the doctrine. Until Nike, it was accepted as ortho-
doxy that false statements made in the course of a commercial
transaction by a seller of a product or service were not entitled to
any constitutional protection. But Nike was unwilling to concede
that point because the communications at issue in Nike v. Kasky
were not conventional advertisements, but were statements about
corporate practices aimed at persuading consumers and opinion-
makers that Nike is a "good corporate citizen. 53 Rather than argu-
ing for constitutional protection for false commercial speech, Nike
took the high road and argued that its speech was not "commer-
cial" speech at all, but core speech about an urgent political and
social matter.54 Thus, Nike maintained, even if some of its state-
ments were inaccurate, they were not actionable as a matter of
fundamental constitutional law.55 And even if the statements were
actionable, Nike contended, because its speech concerned matters
of public importance, liability could be imposed only if the plain-
tiff could surmount the New York Times56 public figure standard-
that is, prove that Nike's statements were made with knowledge of
falsity, or with reckless disregard for truth or falsity.57
Nike's first argument urged a substantial reformulation of the
domain of the commercial speech doctrine. Stripped to its essen-
tials, Nike's contention was that "context" is all-important in as-
sessing whether speech is "commercial. 58  Nike claimed that
speech that might be deemed "commercial" when aimed at con-
sumers may not be so characterized if directed towards other audi-
53 Brief for the Petitioners at (i), Nike (No. 02-575).
54 Id. at 22-30 (describing the errors of the California Supreme Court in holding that
Nike's speech was commercial speech).
15 Id. at 44-45.
56 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5' Brief for the Petitioners at 44-45, Nike (No. 02-575).
s Id. at 22-26.
2004]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ences. Relying on its context-based arguments, Nike contended
that statements responding to charges it exploited foreign workers
could not be categorized as commercial speech because they were
made in press releases, letters to newspaper editors, and letters to
athletic directors, rather than in direct-to-consumer ads promoting
specific Nike products. 59  Opinion-makers, Nike pointed out, are
not consumers, and efforts to persuade them that Nike is a fair-
minded corporation is hardly equivalent to hawking the newest
"Air Jordans" to consumers for $100 a pair.60 Moreover, Nike ar-
gued, these statements were speech on an important political and
social issue-the treatment of foreign workers by major multina-
tional corporations-and thus they were entitled to the virtually
absolute protection the First Amendment gives to core speech.61
Under Nike's theory, even if Nike's statements were inaccurate,
the corporation could not be called on to account for them in
court.62 The marketplace of ideas, Nike contended, would sort out
truth and falsity, but only if spirited debate could proceed unin-
hibited by the threat of government intervention.
As a fallback, Nike attacked the substance of the commercial
speech test. Nike recognized a serious vulnerability in its argu-
ment. Core speech on political and social matters, even if false,
may not, except under rare circumstances, be suppressed or regu-
lated by the government.63 For that reason, Nike's theory would
apply with equal force to deliberate, calculated lies as well as un-
59 Id. Nike's context-based argument was not aided by its insistence that Kasky's case be
decided on a motion to dismiss, which provided the Court with little background information
with which to judge the parties' context-based contentions. For his part, Kasky contended that
the six allegedly false statements made by Nike appeared in nine separate communications,
including "a two-page letter with Nike's logo from Nike's Director of Sports Marketing to uni-
versity presidents and directors of athletics;" postings on Nike's Web site; a press release; a "33-
page illustrated pamphlet;" a "two-page letter with Nike's logo from Nike's PR Manager,
Europe, to International Restructuring Education Network Europe;" full-page advertisements in
leading newspapers (including The New York Times, The Washington Post, USA Today, and The
San Francisco Chronicle) quoting former U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young, who had con-
ducted an investigation for Nike on its operations abroad, that Nike was "operating morally";
and a "letter to the editor of The New York Times from Nike's Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer." Brief for Respondent at 5-6, Nike (No. 02-575). Nike's brief, on the other hand, de-
scribed the communications in terms of press accounts, Nike press releases, letters to university
administrators, letters to newspaper editors, and advertisements in major newspapers. Brief for
the Petitioners at 2, 9-12, Nike (No. 02-575).
60 Brief for the Petitioners at 21, Nike (No. 02-575) (arguing that under the California Su-
preme Court's decision, Nike's statements about "labor conditions in its Southeast Asia facto-
ries have no more protection under the First Amendment than a supermarket flyer advertising
Nike 'Shox' shoes for $69").
61 Id. at 27.
62 id.
63 See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (reaffirming the special protec-
tion given to speech concerning public issues); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278-
79 & n.19 (1964) (noting that even false statements bear some value in public debate).
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intentional falsehoods. Nike would thus be open to the charge that
it was asking the Court to give corporations a "right to lie"-an
accusation Nike understandably was anxious to avoid. But Nike
also did not want its speech held to a negligence standard, 64 be-
cause in that case Nike might face a trial that could demonstrate
that its statements were indeed false, even if not negligently
made.65
Nike therefore added a second leg to its argument: it acknowl-
edged that false statements of fact made by a commercial speaker
on a matter of political or social importance could be actionable,
but only if the rigorous "actual malice" standards of New York
Times66 were met.67 According to Nike's theory, if Nike know-
64 Nike argued that the California laws invoked by the plaintiff established a "strict liabil-
ity" standard by imposing liability for any misstatement of fact Nike may have made, regardless
of "fault." Brief for the Petitioners at 3, 44-45, Nike (No. 02-575). By the time the case reached
the Supreme Court, however, the California Supreme Court had made clear that a private plain-
tiff like Kasky, who claimed no individualized harm, could not recover damages or force dis-
gorgement of profits in a case brought under the state's unfair competition and false advertising
laws. See Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 725 (Cal. 2000). Moreover,
Kasky's amended complaint alleged that Nike's misstatements were made intentionally and did
not claim that liability could be imposed regardless of fault. Brief for Respondent at 6, Nike
(No. 02-575). Nor does it appear that the California Supreme Court had ever addressed the
question of whether the laws at issue permitted liability to be imposed without a showing of
fault. For these reasons, it is doubtful that the Court would have adopted Nike's reading of
California law as imposing a strict liability regime; that question is quintessentially one of Cali-
fornia law and the United States Supreme Court generally avoids pronouncements on state law
questions in the absence of a definitive ruling on the question by a state court of last resort. Cf
R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (stating that federal courts should not inter-
vene except when there is no means to secure a definitive ruling in the state court without con-
stitutional violations).
65 Of course, under a "strict liability" standard, any falsehood might expose Nike to a
judgment. But even a fault-based negligence standard was unacceptable to Nike, both because
negligence is a question for a trier-of-fact and thus is determined after a trial (which Nike
wanted to avoid) and because Nike may well have negligently made false statements, as one
might infer from the fact that Nike settled the case for $1.5 million. It is also telling that Nike
did not invoke California's anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP)
statute, section 425.16 of the California Civil Procedure Code, which applies to actions "arising
from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under
the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue." CAL. CrV. PRoc.
CODE § 425.16(b)(l) (West Supp. 2004). California's "anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to allow
early dismissal of meritless first amendment cases aimed at chilling expression through costly,
time-consuming litigation," by requiring a libel plaintiff "to demonstrate a probability of pre-
vailing on the challenged claims" prior to discovery. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097,
1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Had Nike been confident that Kasky could not
demonstrate that Nike's statements were false, Nike could have invoked California's anti-
SLAPP law, which, as the Ninth Circuit noted in Vess, has been used by many major corpora-
tions to bring a swift and inexpensive end to such litigation. id.; see also DuPont Merck Pharm.
Co. v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
66 New York Times announced the rule that a "public official" is barred "from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964). The rule has been extended to "public figures" who are "involved in issues in
which the public has a justified and important interest." Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
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ingly lied or recklessly made an assertion of fact that was untrue
and an individual reasonably relied on that assertion to her detri-
ment, then such a falsehood might be actionable. 68 Nike's submis-
sions provided no hint as to how such a case might arise or how a
plaintiff would have sufficient knowledge of Nike's state of mind
to meet the demanding pleading and proof requirements in an ac-
tual malice case. But Nike used this concession to contest any
claim that it was seeking a license to lie to the public.69
Although no court had ever applied the New York Times test
in a traditional commercial speech case, Nike presented a sophisti-
cated justification for giving its speech the highest degree of First
Amendment protection. Nike argued that the commercial speech
doctrine rendered the playing field between Nike and its critics
uneven.70  While Nike could be held liable for misstatements of
fact that were made in error, its critics could be sanctioned for
making unfounded allegations about Nike only if Nike, plainly a
"public figure," could overcome the rigorous New York Times
standard. This asymmetry, Nike noted, would apply even though
the statements addressed the same issue of political and social con-
cern, albeit from opposite perspectives. 7' Nike argued that the
First Amendment prohibited the government from playing favor-
ites in dispensing free speech rights, and emphasized the unfair-
ness of a legal regime that subjected participants in the same de-
bate to two wholly different standards of liability in the event they
misstated facts relevant to their arguments.
72
130, 134 (1967). The Court, however, has construed the "public figure" category narrowly.
See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979) (holding that petitioner
was not a "public figure" merely because he was involved with a matter that drew public atten-
tion); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134 (1979) (holding that a research behavioral
scientist was not a "public figure" because he did not occupy a special role of prominence or
power). Large corporations generally qualify as "public figures." See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985) (holding that a credit reporting
agency was not liable where false statements were not a matter of public concern).
67 Brief for the Petitioners at 44-45, Nike (No. 02-575) (arguing that some amount of error
in speech is inevitable and protection must be given to that error).
6 id.
69 id.
70 Id.
71 id. at 40-42.
72 Id. Many of Nike's corporate amici made the same point. The brief submitted by the
National Association of Manufacturers, for example, stated that the
thesis of this brief is that, when a manufacturer is responding to a public attack on its
product or the product is otherwise the focus of public debate or controversy, the
manufacturer's statements are due the same full First Amendment protection as
those of its critics. The reduced protections afforded to commercial speech are in-
sufficient to prevent the substantial chilling of useful speech by manufacturers that
would, if not inhibited, inform and enrich the public debate.
Brief for the National Association of Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 2, Nike (No. 02-575); see also id. at 12 ("[A] double standard of constitutional protection
1064 [Vol. 54:4
LESSONS FROM A STORY UNTOLD
Not surprisingly, Kasky and his supporters saw Nike v. Kasky
as a garden-variety commercial speech case. From their stand-
point, the issue in Nike was whether the First Amendment protects
a company's false statements about its products made to stimulate
sales and likely to matter greatly to some consumers in their pur-
chasing decisions.73 The answer to that question was, in their
view, plainly, "No." Kasky and his amici dismissed Nike's con-
tention that the speech at issue was political speech intended to
influence policy, not commercial speech, on two grounds.
To begin with, Kasky and his supporters argued that the facts
refuted Nike's claim that it was seeking to influence policymakers
and not consumer purchasing decisions. They pointed out that
many of Nike's communications were sent to present and former
customers-college and university administrators and athletic di-
rectors-and to newspapers, at times in the form of paid adver-
tisements, for the purpose of maintaining and increasing sales.7 4
As to the substance of the communications, Kasky and his
supporters took aim at Nike's effort to draw a line between state-
ments about price, safety, and "the essential functions" of a prod-
uct that Nike admitted constituted commercial speech and state-
ments about political and social issues that Nike claimed were core
speech. That line, Kasky argued, was wholly subjective and at
odds with factors that actually influence consumer purchasing de-
cisions.75 For many of Nike's customers, Nike's treatment of its
foreign labor force is as or more important than price, appearance,
durability, or other features or characteristics of Nike's products-
would necessarily give a significant advantage to one side of a public debate, a constitutionally
impermissible result."); see also, e.g., Brief of the Business Roundtable as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 2, Nike (No. 02-575) (arguing that providing protection to only one
side in a debate decreases the value of the debate); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America in Support of Petitioners at 16-17, Nike (No. 02-
575) (arguing against a rule that discriminates based on the speaker's identity); Brief of
ExxonMobil, Microsoft, Morgan Stanley, and GlaxoSmithKline as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 13-14, Nike (2003) (No. 02-575) (arguing that a speaker on one side may not be
discriminated against by government regulation).
73 Brief for Respondent at (i), Nike (No. 02-575) (stating as the issue whether Nike's
speech is commercial and subject to laws governing false commercial speech); see also Brief of
Amici Curiae State of California et al. in Support of Respondent at 2, Nik~e (No. 02-575) (de-
scribing the complaint as alleging "that Nike engaged in a publicity campaign asserting objec-
tively verifiable false facts to mislead consumers about Nike's labor practices in order to as-
suage consumer concerns and promote the sale of Nike products"); Brief of Amicus Curiae
Public Citizen at (i), Nike (No. 02-575) (reformulating the question presented, "more properly
stated," as "Does the First Amendment immunize a company from a lawsuit alleging that the
company made specific false factual representations, as part of a campaign to persuade consum-
ers that its labor practices were lawful and proper, merely because those practices are also the
subject of public controversy?").
74 Brief for Respondent at 3-5, 29-36, Nike (No. 02-575).
71 Id. at 33-36.
20041
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
a point underscored by the fact that Nike's public relations cam-
paign was an effort to reverse the tide of consumer defections
made in protest of Nike's foreign labor practices.76
Kasky and his amici also contended that Nike's argument was
beside the point because Nike did not simply engage in an aca-
demic debate about the impact of globalization on developing
countries, but had instead made specific assertions of objective and
verifiable facts about its labor practices, and Nike could be held
accountable if its factual assertions were false.77 After all, Nike
had asserted as a matter of fact that it paid workers in subcon-
tracted factories "double" the minimum wage, complied with all
applicable worker health and safety and environmental standards,
and provided workers with free meals and health care.78 Kasky
and his supporters also dismissed Nike's contention that consumer
concerns about such matters were just "moral judgments that only
indirectly affect consumer behavior" or influence purchasing deci-
sions "only secondarily, if at all.",79  They pointed out that many
product attributes that could be characterized in moral or political
terms are crucial in purchasing decisions. For example, just like
sneaker customers who will vote with their dollars against Nike if
they believe that Nike exploits its workers, many consumers will
seek to buy only tuna caught in a dolphin-safe manner, or to pur-
chase only clothing bearing a union or "Made in the USA" label,
because those labels signify respect for and compliance with labor-
friendly wage and worker-protection laws.8 ° Yet, Kasky argued,
under Nike's theory, sellers could make false claims about these
characteristics but nonetheless escape liability by characterizing
76 Id.; see also Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent by Members of the United
States Congress at 2, 10-14, Nike (No. 02-575) (noting that moral concerns may be more impor-
tant than price in a wide variety of contexts).
77 Brief for Respondent at 37-38, Nike (No. 02-575) (arguing that motivation for Nike's
speech was not social issues but rather to increase sales and profits).
78 See supra note 2.
79 Brief for the Petitioners at 19, 36, Nike (No. 02-575).
80 Brief for Respondent at 37-41, 44-46, Nike (No. 02-575) (arguing that even though
Nike claims the purpose of the speech was not economically motivated, some consumers rely on
such speech to make economic decisions); Brief of Amici Curiae State of California et al. in
Support of Respondent at 7-9, Nike (No. 02-575) (claiming that Nike's speech on social issues is
a tool for generating sales); Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent by Members of the
United States Congress at 2, 10-14, Nike (No. 02-575) (claiming that Nike is wrong to believe
that social concerns are less important to consumers than price); see also Enforcement Policy
Statement on U.S. Origin Claims, 62 Fed. Reg. 63,756, 63,767-71 (Dec. 2, 1997) (Federal Trade
Commission policy that products bearing "Made in USA" must in fact have been made in the
United States); Su-Ping Lu, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the FTC: Advancing Human
Rights Through Deceptive Advertising Law, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 603, 624 (2000)
(noting that the "human rights practices" of a manufacturer are undoubtedly part of consumers'
decisions).
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their statements as "core" speech about matters of social and po-
81litical importance.
Nike v. Kasky thus presented the Court with a provocative,
sweeping critique of the commercial speech doctrine. It is no sur-
prise that the Court thought that Nike might help clarify and make
more coherent a doctrine that had long frustrated the Court. But
with Nike's dismissal and settlement, that reconsideration will
have to await another case and another day.
III. LESSONS FROM NIKE V. KASKY
The remainder of this Article explores the implications of the
Court's non-ruling in Nike v. Kasky and anticipates the likely fate
of the commercial speech doctrine once the next Nike case comes
along. It is, of course, hazardous to base predictions on a case un-
decided. Nonetheless, among the many arguments rehearsed be-
fore the Court in Nike, three lessons clearly emerge.
A. Lesson Number One: There Is No Credible Argument That the
Commercial Speech Doctrine Gives Government a "Powerful
Weapon of Suppression"
Despite the impassioned rhetoric of Nike and other critics of
the commercial speech doctrine, the doctrine is no longer a power-
ful weapon of suppression in the hands of government,82 if indeed
it ever was such a weapon after the Court's declaration in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy that commercial speech is entitled to
First Amendment protection. Certainly the statistics do not bear
out the critics' claim. In the twenty-eight years since Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy, the Court has decided two dozen com-
mercial speech cases. 83 In only five cases has the Court upheld a
81 Brief for Respondent at 37-41, 44-46, Nike (No. 02-575).
82 Kozinksi & Banner, supra note 19, at 653.
83 Of course, the exact tally depends on what is counted. The core commercial speech
cases include the following: Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979);
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); Posadas de Puerto Rico Asso-
ciates v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466
(1988); Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disci-
plinary Commission, 496 U.S. 91 (1990); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993); United States
v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and
Professional Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476
(1995); Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States, 527
U.S. 173 (1999); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Thompson v. Western
2004] 1067
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
restraint on commercial speech, and there is reason to doubt that
the Court today would rule the same way in at least three of those
cases. 84  The Court has not upheld a single restraint in the past
decade. Although the Court retains the shell of the intermediate
scrutiny/Central Hudson test, critics have already won the first
battle of the commercial speech war, because the Central Hudson
test that the Court actually applies routinely results in the invalida-
tion of restraints on truthful commercial speech.86
As originally conceived, the commercial speech doctrine was
an attempt by the Court to reconcile two competing interests. On
the one hand, the Court wanted to increase the flow of accurate
commercial information to consumers about the goods and ser-
vices they purchase. This goal of listener empowerment or auton-
omy, the Court thought, was compatible with one well-settled First
Amendment theory-namely, that the First Amendment was in-
tended to promote the flow of information to citizens about impor-
tant matters to enable them to make better choices. 87 For the ordi-
States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002). Some might add a few other decisions, including
those addressing billboards and news racks. Compare Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,
453 U.S. 490, 513 (1981) (upholding city's ban on commercial billboards but striking it down
with regard to noncommercial billboards), with City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,
507 U.S. 410, 430-31 (1993) (invalidating ordinance that prohibited use of news racks for
"commercial handbills" but not newspapers). Additionally, there are those cases dealing with
claims of compelled commercial speech. Compare Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.,
521 U.S. 457, 473 (1997) (finding no compelled speech violation for fruit growers forced to
help pay for government-sponsored advertisements), with United States v. United Foods, 533
U.S. 405, 415-16 (2001) (finding compelled speech violation for mushroom growers forced to
help pay for government-sponsored advertisements). See also Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980) (finding compelled speech violation for rule prohibiting
utilities from including bill inserts discussing controversial issues).
84 The Court upheld restraints in Ohralik, Friedman, Posadas, Edge Broadcasting, and
Florida Bar, and it might reach the same result were Florida Bar and Ohralik heard today. On
the change of heart side of the ledger, it is hard to see how, in light of its more recent ruling in
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n, the Court would uphold today the restraints sustained
in Edge Broadcasting and Posadas. The Court in 44 Liquormart explicitly casts doubt on the
validity of Posadas. And the Court's ruling in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n is at
odds with Edge Broadcasting. It is also unlikely that the Court would reach the same result in
Friedman, especially in light of its rulings in Ibanez, Peel, and In re R.M.J. While the Court
might rule the same way in Ohralik and Florida Bar, even those decisions would be open to
question. The Court in Edenfield was careful to limit Ohralik's reach to direct, in-person solici-
tation by lawyers, and the Court split five-to-four in Florida Bar, suggesting that even that
ruling might be subject to reconsideration. Indeed, in light of Western States, the Court might
well require the Florida Bar to use non-speech-limiting means to ensure that lawyers do not
disturb the privacy of recent accident victims and their families.
85 The Court's 1994 decision in Florida Bar marked the last time that Court upheld a re-
straint on commercial speech.
86 Even the Court acknowledges the transformation of the Central Hudson test. The Court
explained in Western States that, although parties had questioned whether the Central Hudson
test should apply, "there is no need in this case to break new ground. Central Hudson, as ap-
plied in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for decision."
Western States, 535 U.S. at 368 (citation omitted).
87 According to the Court, because commercial speech is
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nary person, the Court thought, finding out about low-price phar-
maceuticals might be every bit as important as learning the day's
latest news on the most pressing social and political matters.
8
While the Court was unwilling to equate speech about commercial
matters with core political speech, and therefore gave commercial
speech a "subordinate" place in the First Amendment hierarchy,
the Court was ready to break with prior precedent and afford
commercial speech a fair measure of First Amendment protection.
On the other hand, the Court understood that the marketplace
had historically been rife with half-truths and falsehoods and that,
absent strong measures, the government could not effectively po-
lice the marketplace. The Court did not want to pull back the
regulatory throttle too far and risk opening a Pandora's Box of
false, misleading, and deceptive speech that might inflict more
harm than good on consumers. As a result, the Court fashioned a
test that gave commercial speech a measure of First Amendment
protection, but left intact substantial governmental authority to im-
pose speech restraints-even on truthful speech-when necessary
to serve important governmental interests. As originally con-
ceived, the Central Hudson test was a reasonable accommodation
of those interests. It said, in essence, that the government could
restrain commercial speech if, but only if, the government could
show that the restraint addressed a real problem and did so in a
reasonable way. The regulation had to be commensurate with the
problem it was imposed to solve, but the precision that is the
touchstone of most First Amendment regulation was not required. 89
indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is
also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system
ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were
thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a de-
mocracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does not serve that goal.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 (footnotes omitted). As support for this theory, the
Court cited ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948) and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-270 (1964). Id. at
765 n.19. The theory that listener autonomy is the central value advanced by protection of
commercial speech was first set out, with considerable prescience, in Martin H. Redish, The
First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression,
39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 433, 441-44 (1971); see also Neubome, supra note 25, at 16 (as-
serting that there is a certain level of tolerance even for false speech because society is skeptical
of the government's ability to control properly the flow of ideas in speech); Robert Post, The
Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 49, 53-54 (2000) (noting that
commercial speech is protected to facilitate a free flow of ideas); David A. Strauss, Persuasion,
Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 356-57 (1991) (suggesting that
false statements may do more to inhibit autonomy than restricting speech).
88 Western States, 535 U.S. at 373; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763.
89 When one examines the early cases closely, the lopsided results are not surprising for at
least two reasons, which may be related. First, with few exceptions, the early commercial
speech cases were aimed at state laws that were designed either to stifle competition for profes-
sional services or to engage in puritanical social engineering by discouraging consumers from
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By the mid-1990s, the Court had begun to ratchet up the stan-
dard of review considerably, and the caution that marked the
Court's early commercial speech cases began to disappear.9° This
doctrinal shift was not necessitated by difficult cases. Indeed, the
shift came first in Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in
Edenfield, with only Justice O'Connor dissenting, and then in 44
Liquormart, where the Court was unanimous as to disposition but
splintered as to rationale.
This turn of events raises an obvious question: Why did the
Court focus on the standard of review in two cases where the stan-
dard had no discernable influence on the cases' outcomes?
One possible reason is that by the mid-1990s the Court had
engaged in an unstated, but seismic, shift in the rationale support-
ing the commercial speech doctrine. Remarkably absent from the
early cases is any discussion of the expressive rights of the com-
mercial speaker. The speakers' rights, if any, were not part of the
Court's calculus in deciding that commercial speech merited con-
stitutional protection. 9' The Court instead focused on the rights of
getting their hands on "sinful" products, such as alcohol, tobacco or contraceptives or wasting
money on gambling. The Court was unwilling to sustain restraints on speech for such flimsy
and paternalistic reasons. Second, most of these cases dealt with antiquated statutes and regula-
tions that long pre-dated Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and had been drafted at a time when
govemment had free rein in economic regulation. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc.,
348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (deferring to the legislature as having the power to control speech of
certain groups with the remedy being the power of the affected groups to exercise their right to
vote). By and large, these restraints were not merely insensitive to First Amendment considera-
tions, they were oblivious to them. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,
489-90 (1996) (pointing out that the statute's constitutionality had been upheld by the Rhode
Island Supreme Court in S & S Liquor Mari v. Pastore, 497 A.2d 729, 730 (R.I. 1985), where
the Court traced the law back to 1956, if not earlier); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S.
476, 480-81 (1995) (pointing out that the statute at issue there was passed shortly after the ratifi-
cation of the Twenty-First Amendment, which took place in 1933); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S.
761, 769-73 (1993) (pointing out that all but three states had abandoned regulating in-person
solicitation of certified public accountants); see also Brief for Respondent at 16-17, Edenfield
(No. 91-1594) (noting that the Florida Rule at issue was based on the "anti-poaching" provision
of the 1917 Code of Professional Ethics of the American Association of Public Accountants,
which provided that "[n]o member shall directly or indirectly solicit nor encroach upon the
business of another member .. "). It was not until Florida Bar, Lorillard, and Western States
that the Court began to confront modem statutes and regulations that were enacted with an eye
towards constitutional review.
90 Indeed, the Court itself recognized in the early commercial speech cases that it must
"act with caution" in moving into "this as yet uncharted area." Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1,
10 n.9 (1979).
91 One striking example of this point is the Court's opinion in Bates v. State Bar of Ari-
zona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Bates was brought by the Arizona State Bar as an enforcement
action against two lawyers, John R. Bates and Van O'Steen, who were alleged to have violated
Arizona's disciplinary rules by publishing an advertisement offering to handle legal services for
"very reasonable fees." Id. at 354. Although Bates and O'Steen were parties to the suit, the
Court barely acknowledged their interest in the matter, or their interest in communicating in-
formation about their practice to prospective clients. All the Court wrote about their interests
was that, "[e]ven though the speaker's interest is largely economic, the Court has protected such
speech in certain contexts." Id. at 364. By way of contrast, the Court then emphasized that the
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the listener/consumer and the importance of the free flow of com-
mercial information to better inform consumer choice. Listener
autonomy-not the interests of the commercial speaker-was the
theory driving these cases. 92 Where the Court perceived a risk to
consumers (as it did in Ohralik, Posadas and Florida Bar), it was
willing to uphold broad speech restraints even when they sup-
pressed truthful and non-deceptive speech.9 3 In this vein, it is
hardly a coincidence that the first successful commercial speech
case, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, was brought by consum-
ers interested in purchasing low-cost drugs, not pharmacists seek-
ing to engage in price advertising. Indeed, a case brought by
pharmacists challenging on due process grounds the same Virginia
statute at issue in Board of Pharmacy had failed only a few years
earlier.94
listener's interest is substantial: the consumer's concern for the free flow of com-
mercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political dia-
logue. Moreover, significant societal interests are served by such speech. Advertis-
ing, though entirely commercial, may often carry information of import to signifi-
cant issues of the day. And commercial speech serves to inform the public of the
availability, nature, and prices of products and services, and thus performs an indis-
pensable role in the allocation of resources in a free enterprise system. In short, such
speech serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable de-
cisionmaking.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Neuborne, supra note 25, at 31-32 (observing that in Bates, "the
Court explicitly recognized the hearer-centered nature of its emerging commercial speech juris-
prudence, and it ... [made] clear that, unlike traditional speaker-centered settings, commercial
speech cannot claim free speech protection if it impedes consumer choice" (footnotes omitted)).
92 In none of the commercial speech cases prior to Edenfield and 44 Liquormart did the
Court advert to or otherwise invoke the seller's "right" of self-expression. This may be a reflec-
tion of the Court's apprehension about ascribing a First Amendment "right" of self-expression
to sellers, who are mainly inanimate corporate entities-an apprehension that is played out in
the Court's five-to-four ruling in First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779-80 (1978)
(holding that corporations have First Amendment rights but reserving the question of whether
those rights are coextensive with those of natural persons), replayed in Consolidated Edison Co.
v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530, 530 (1980) (invalidating a rule prohibiting public
utilities from including in their monthly bills inserts discussing controversial issues), and most
recently revisited in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 124 S. Ct. 619, 644-45 (2003)
(reaffirming prior rulings upholding strict prohibition on the use of corporate monies to finance
candidate elections). Professor Baker's contribution to this Symposium powerfully lays out the
theoretical problems in shifting to a rationale for First Amendment protection of commercial
speech that depends on safeguarding the expressive rights of corporate speakers. C. Edwin
Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech Quandary in Nike,
54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161 (2004).
93 As the Court often repeated, the goal of the doctrine was to ensure that commercial in-
formation flows "cleanly as well as freely." See, e.g., Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 768; In re R.M.J.,
455 U.S. 191,201 n.12 (1982); Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771-72.
94 Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969) (three-judge court)
(holding that a statutory provision forbidding advertising drug prices was valid as not intruding
on free speech). As the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy Court noted, the difference in plain-
tiffs was of crucial importance to the way the lower court viewed the case (and perhaps the way
the Supreme Court itself viewed the case):
The District Court seized on the identity of the plaintiff-appellees as consumers as a
feature distinguishing the present case from Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, supra.
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By the time the Court decided Edenfield and 44 Liquormart, it
was ready to embrace a broader justification for protecting truthful
commercial speech. The Court's new approach is based at least in
part on a First Amendment theory that focuses on the rights of
self-expression of the commercial actor. This new focus can be
seen clearly in Edenfield, where the Court held as unconstitutional
Florida's all-out ban on in-person solicitation by certified public
accountants, not just because the ban impeded the flow of informa-
tion to the accountant's prospective customers, but also because it
interfered with an accountant's First Amendment right to meet
with and discuss his services with potential clients.95 The same
concern is evident in the Court's debate in 44 Liquormart. Al-
though the Court did not hold that Central Hudson no longer ap-
plies in that circumstance, the message delivered in 44 Liquormart
is that broad restraints on truthful speech bear a heavy presumption
of invalidity, not just because they deprive consumers of informa-
tion, but also because they muzzle commercial speakers who have
a First Amendment right to convey truthful information to willing
listeners.
The Court's recent decisions in Lorillard and Western States
underscore just how dramatic the shift has been. At the core of
each case was the Court's concern for the expressive rights of the
commercial speaker. In Lorillard, the Court was ultimately
swayed by the argument that the Massachusetts ordinance would
cripple the tobacco industry's ability to communicate its messages
to adults in many urban areas of the state. In Western States, the
Court was persuaded that if pharmacists were to be granted the
right to engage in drug compounding, the government could not
require them to forego advertising simply because some pharma-
cists might abuse the privilege: Nonspeech means would have to
be used to address the objective of limiting the compounding ac-
tivities of pharmacists. In both cases, the Court gave serious con-
sideration to the speakers' rights of self-expression and found that
they outweighed the consumer protection goals of the restraints.
Had these cases been presented to the Court a decade earlier-
when the Central Hudson test paid deference to governmental
judgments and looked for a "reasonable," not near-perfect, fit be-
Because the unsuccessful plaintiffs in that earlier case were pharmacists, the court
said, "theirs was a prima facie commercial approach."... The present plaintiffs, on
the other hand, were asserting an interest in their own health that was "fundamen-
tally deeper than a trade consideration."
Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 754-55 (quoting Va. Citizens Consumers Council, Inc. v. Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Va. 1974) (three-judge court)).
9' Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 766-69.
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tween the government's objective and the measure imposed-the
restraints would likely have been upheld.
This doctrinal shift may auger well for Nike and its corporate
supporters, because Nike's core argument was based on its right of
self-expression. Nike took every opportunity to drive home the
point that it had an equal right to be heard in the debate over its
treatment of foreign workers and that cases like Kasky's chilled
Nike's ability to participate fully in that debate.96 Nike's argument
seems to have persuaded Justice Breyer and Justice O'Connor-
two critical votes on the Court-who made it clear in their Nike
dissent that if a Nike-like case were to return to the Court, they
would "apply a form of heightened scrutiny to the speech regula-
tions in question" and strike them down.
97
B. Lesson Number Two: Applicability of New York Times v. Sullivan
Protection May Be the Next Commercial Speech Battleground
Although many of the arguments in Nike v. Kasky had been
presented to the Court in earlier cases, Nike raised one argument
that was entirely novel-that it was entitled to full New York Times
protection for speech responding to charges that it mistreated its
foreign workers. Never before had a commercial speaker argued
to the Supreme Court that New York Times shielded it from a gov-
ernment-imposed sanction for making a false statement of fact.
On one level, Nike's argument has appeal. No speaker, com-
mercial or otherwise, should be handcuffed in a public debate
about a matter of undeniable social and political importance. Nor
does it seem fair, as Nike hammered home, that opposing sides
should be subject to different liability standards if they misstate
96 The word "debate" has many connotations. Nike's submissions framed the question be-
fore the Court in terms of statements made "[w]hen a corporation participates in a public de-
bate .. " Brief for the Petitioners at (i), Nike (No. 02-575). The imagery used in Nike's briefs
makes it appear that Nike's statements were uttered in the heat of battle, with little time for
reflection or attention to detail. See, e.g., id. at 39-40 (arguing that companies will be "invaria-
bly hesitant to react when called on, as Nike has been here, to make on-the-spot responses to
accusations" if they must first "verify all the facts" or risk being held liable). Were Nike's
statements actually made in the heat of battle, Nike's defense might be on firmer footing, be-
cause a trier of fact would be hard pressed to find fault with a speaker who misspoke in the
midst of a debate that demanded an immediate response. See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae
Pfizer Inc. in Support of Petitioners at 18-24, Nike (No. 02-575) (arguing that the Court should
constitutionalize a corporation's response to criticisms on matters of public importance under a
"Right to Reply" theory). But the record in the case, although sparse, does not bear out Nike's
characterization. At least according to the plaintiff's allegations, which were not controverted
by Nike because the case did not proceed beyond the motion to dismiss stage, Nike's statements
were not made in the spur of the moment without an opportunity for reflection and fact-
checking. Rather, they were part of a carefully orchestrated media campaign designed to pro-
mote Nike as a labor-friendly, responsible company and to counter contrary arguments made by
Nike's critics. Brief for Respondent at 5-6, 37, Nike (No. 02-575).
97 Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2560, 2565 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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facts during the course of a public debate. The way to level the
playing field, Nike contended, was to give all combatants the full
constitutional protection reflected in the New York Times actual
malice standard. By following Nike's approach, the government
would let the marketplace of ideas sort out truth and falsity.
98
Nike's argument on this score sparked enormous interest within
the business community and was echoed throughout the amici
briefs filed in support of Nike.99 The argument is thus certain to
soon be replayed in court.
There are many reasons to doubt that courts will accept Nike's
argument and engraft libel law concepts as a limit on the commer-
cial speech doctrine. Most problematic is that under Nike's ap-
proach, many false statements of fact made by sellers on matters
that could even arguably touch on important social or political is-
sues would generally be beyond the reach of regulators. Accord-
ing to Nike's theory, its statements that it pays its workers double
the minimum wage and provides them free meals and health care
could be the subject of litigation only if a plaintiff relied on Nike's
misstatement in purchasing a Nike product and had sufficient
knowledge of Nike's state of mind to allege that Nike knew or
should have known that its statements were false when they were
made. l°° But because Nike, not its critics, has superior access to
the facts-a point repeatedly touted by Nike-it would be the rare
case where a plaintiff could actually plead and prove a case against
Nike. There is no doubt that this is why Nike argued for such a
formidable standard.' 0 '
Unless the Court is willing to make a clean break from past
precedent, it will not permit commercial speakers to escape ac-
countability for false statements when they are made even in part
98 Brief for the Petitioners at 44-45, Nike (No. 02-575).
99 See supra note 74.
'0 Nike discounted the idea that consumers place stock in what Nike characterized as
"moral judgments that only indirectly affect consumer behavior" or influence purchasing deci-
sions only "secondarily, if at all," suggesting that reasonable consumers would not generally
rely on Nike representations about its treatment of its workers in deciding to purchase a Nike
product. Brief for the Petitioners at 19, 22, 36, Nike (No. 02-575).
101 Any plaintiff, even one who had relied on Nike's statements in purchasing Nike prod-
ucts, would have a difficult time bringing a Nike-like case under an actual malice standard.
Actual malice turns on the defendant's state of knowledge-what the defendant knew or should
have known about a statement's accuracy. Only a plaintiff with access to the facts equal or
superior to that of the defendant is typically in a position to make these allegations. A libel
plaintiff is likely to be in that position because of her superior knowledge of the facts, but not a
false advertising plaintiff like Marc Kasky, a point recognized by Nike's supporters. See Brief
for the National Association of Manufacturers as Arnicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 11,
Nike (No. 02-575) ("[B]ecause of its special incentives and resources, the manufacturer or pro-
ducer will possess knowledge about the qualities of its products that no other participant in the
debate is in a position to provide.").
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to influence consumer purchasing decisions. The Court has long
recognized that "there is no constitutional value in false statements
of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially
advances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open'
debate on public issues.' ' 2
This general point takes on special force where commercial
speech is concerned. Commercial speech warrants protection only
where it enables consumers to make "intelligent and well in-
formed" decisions103-a value subverted by false information. For
this reason, the one thread that ties together all of the Court's
commercial speech cases, from Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
to the Court's most recent decision in Western States, is the
Court's hostility to false commercial speech. As Justice Stewart
put it in his concurring opinion, "the elimination of false and de-
ceptive claims serves to promote the one facet of commercial price
and product advertising that warrants First Amendment protec-
tion-its contribution to the flow of accurate and reliable informa-
tion relevant to public and private decisionmaking." 1°4 "[L]eeway
for untruthful or misleading expression that has been allowed in
other contexts has little force in the commercial arena. 0 05  Al-
though the Court has expressed misgivings about the Central Hud-
son test with regard to restraints on truthful commercial speech, it
has never expressed any interest in providing a greater shield to
safeguard false or misleading commercial speech. Thus, to the
extent that Nike's New York Times argument is seen as a way for
commercial speakers to avoid accountability for making false or
misleading statements of fact, that argument is unlikely to fare
well in the Court.
102 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)); see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942) ("[Falsehoods] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality.").
'o
3 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976) ("Purely factual matter of public interest may claim [First Amendment] protec-
tion.").
14Id. at 781 (Stewart, J., concurring).
'05 Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977). Similar statements abound in the Court's
cases. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) ("The evils of false commercial speech, which may have an immediate harmful impact on
commercial transactions, together with the ability of purveyors of commercial speech to control
falsehoods, explain why we tolerate more governmental regulation of this speech than of most
other speech."); see also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (false and
misleading speech "is not protected by the First Amendment"); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) ("The First Amendment's concern for com-
mercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising. Consequently, there can
be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately
inform the public about lawful activity." (citation omitted)).
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Moreover, when examined closely, Nike's justifications for
extending New York Times protection to its speech fall apart. Con-
trary to Nike's suggestion, the New York Times standard was not
intended to level the playing field between powerful institutions
and their critics, let alone to equalize the liability standards be-
tween the powerful and everyone else. Indeed, Nike's argument
stands the rationale for New York Times on its head. The Court
forged the New York Times standard to empower ordinary mem-
bers of the public, who do not have ready access to the press or
deep pockets to gain access to the media, to engage and criticize
public officials, public figures, and powerful institutions, like the
Nike Corporation. The Court assumed that the rich and powerful
have ample means to make sure their voices are heard.' °6 But the
First Amendment was not intended to be the exclusive preserve of
the rich and powerful. For ordinary individuals and small, thinly
capitalized organizations, the Court thought, the threat of ruinous
libel litigation and possibly a bankrupting judgment would silence
all but the most resolute critics, since even a single misstatement
of fact might bring disaster.10 7 The New York Times standard was
developed to protect the otherwise disenfranchised so that they
could be full participants in the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open" debate that lies at the heart of the First Amendment.1
0 8
Nike's theory destabilizes the equilibrium brought about by New
York Times and cuts New York Times loose from its moorings by
transforming it from a shield for the "little guy" to enable him to
criticize the powerful into a shield for the powerful, all in the name
of equality.
Nor are the concerns that animated the Court in New York
Times present in the commercial speech context. New York Times
was prompted, at least in part, by the recognition that "erroneous
statement[s] of fact" are "inevitable in free debate" over political
and social matters. 1°9 But misstatements of fact are hardly inevita-
ble when a corporation is making factual representations about its
own products and the conditions under which they are made. Nike
"knows more ... than anyone else" about whether its products are
'06Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 ("Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic op-
portunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy.").
'07N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279 ("[W]ould-be critics ... may be deterred from voicing their
criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of
doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so.").
'(°See id. at 269-70 (noting that the First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people"
(quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484 (1957))).
'o5Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
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manufactured in compliance with wage and hour and health and
safety laws; its statements on those matters should be "easily veri-
fiable."' 10 The corollary to this point is that Nike is also in the best
position to judge the limits of its speakers' knowledge about
Nike's global operations and to act accordingly, either by refrain-
ing from speaking when Nike does not have possession of the
relevant facts or by stating whatever qualifications are needed to
ensure accuracy. It is hardly unreasonable to hold Nike to a high
standard of accuracy when it is making statements about facts
uniquely within its possession.
For another thing, Nike is neither the defenseless victim it
portrays itself to be, nor is the playing field as uneven as Nike
suggests. Not only does Nike, a company worth $20 billion,"'
have ample resources to ensure that its voice is heard, but Nike
also has powerful weapons at its disposal should one of its critics
make a false statement about Nike or its products that injures Nike.
California, like every other state, permits corporations to bring ac-
tions for defamation and product disparagement." 2 Whether Nike
or any other corporation needs to prove actual malice or simple
negligence depends not on the status of its critics, but on whether
the corporation is a "public figure" and whether the statements are
of "public concern."'" 13  But even if a corporation is held to the
highest standards, the threat of protracted litigation by a giant like
Nike strikes fear in the heart of every one of Nike's potential crit-
"
0 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-
72 n.24 (1976). Justice Stewart made the same point in his concurrence:
The principles recognized in the libel decisions suggest that the government may
take broader action to protect the public from injury produced by false or deceptive
price or product advertising than from harm caused by defamation. In contrast to the
press, which must often attempt to assemble the true facts from sketchy and some-
times conflicting sources under the pressure of publication deadlines, the commer-
cial advertiser generally knows the product or service he seeks to sell and is in a po-
sition to verify the accuracy of his factual representations before he disseminates
them. The advertiser's access to the truth about his product... substantially elimi-
nates any danger that governmental regulation ... will chill accurate and nondecep-
tive commercial expression. There is, therefore, little need to sanction some false-
hood in order to protect speech that matters.
Id. at 777-78 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
"'See Yahoo/Finance, Quotes & Info, Nike Inc. (NKE) http://finance.yahoo.com/
q?s=NKE&d=t (last visited Apr. 2, 2004) (reporting that Nike has a market value of over $20
billion).
11
2 See, e.g., Suzuki Motors Corp. v. Consumers Union, 330 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2003) (al-
lowing Suzuki to file an action alleging that Consumers Union's ongoing publication of a nega-
tive Samurai rating constituted product disparagement), panel opinion reinstated, 330 F.3d 1127
(9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 468 (2003).
11
3 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346-48 (setting out test for the imposition of liability in private-
figure defamation actions against the press for publishing matters of "public or general inter-
est"); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (setting out actual malice test).
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ics/defendants. 114 Any misstep may well mean the death knell for
the organization. 115  Corporate defamation and product disparage-
ment cases carry the threat of protracted discovery 16 and often
cannot be resolved on motions for summary judgment.' I7  Public
interest groups facing libel actions well understand that taking a
case to trial can exhaust the organization's resources and that an
adverse ruling can threaten its existence. The same obviously can-
not be said of Nike.ll 8
114 Even the most highly respected and powerful corporate critics are vulnerable to exis-
tence-threatening libel litigation. Consider Suzuki Motors Corp., where the Ninth Circuit re-
versed a grant of summary judgment to Consumers Union and remanded the case for a full trial
on Suzuki's claim that a Consumers Report article on the rollover propensity of the Suzuki
Samurai was libelous. Judge Kozinski pointed out in his dissent from the denial of rehearing en
banc that by September 1999, while the case was still pending in the district court:
Consumers Union.. . reportedly spent more than $10 million defending its ratings,
while its two adversaries had spent more than $25 million. See John O'Dell, Bruis-
ing Tests Await Consumer Reports in Court, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1999, at Al. And
these are just two of the many lawsuits CU has had to contend with-about a dozen
published cases (and who knows how many unpublished ones) involving disgruntled
CU reviewees seeking revenge through the courts. Good for lawyers, but not so
good for free expression.
Suzuki Motors Corp., 330 F.3d at 1115 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). This is not the first time that
Consumers Union has been faced with potentially ruinous product disparagement litigation.
See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (regarding Consumers Union's
evaluation and disparaging review of the BOSE 901 sound system).
.. See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 125 F.R.D. 185 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (order forcing Christic Insti-
tute, a human rights organization, into bankruptcy because it was unable to pay $1 million sanc-
tion for participating in lawsuit found to be factually unsupported under Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
11 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979) (permitting discovery into the defen-
dant's state of mind in libel action governed by New York Times).
117 See, e.g., Suzuki Motors Corp., 330 F.3d at 1132 (ruling that the evidence raised genu-
ine issues of material fact); see also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496
(1991) (holding that the evidence presented a question for the jury).
18 Given the depth of Nike's pockets, it is fair to ask whether Nike's principal concern
was, as it claimed, the possibility of facing a speech-chilling, substantial money judgment-
which was remote by the time the case reached the Supreme Court-or having the truth about
its labor practices determined publicly in court. This point is important because many public
interest organizations have faced survival-threatening libel litigation but have not engaged in the
extensive self-censorship Nike claims flowed directly from the mere pendency of Nike v. Kasky.
Certainly Consumers Union has not altered the editorial content of Consumers Reports because
of the Suzuki litigation. Nor did the Natural Resources Defense Council close up shop after it
faced a multi-million dollar libel and product disparagement action by the apple industry in the
wake of its efforts to get the pesticide Alar off the market. Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 800 F.
Supp. 941 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (granting NRDC summary judgment). In the wake of the defense
victory in the Alar litigation, many states passed what are referred to as "Veggie" libel laws to
make it easier for corporate plaintiffs in product disparagement cases to prevail. See Timur
Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683,
749 n.230 (1999) (collecting state statutes). Oprah Winfrey, the talk show hostess, was sued by
cattle producers relying in part on the Texas False Disparagement of Perishable Food Products
Act after she hosted a show to discuss the risks of "Mad Cow" disease. Engler v. Winfrey, 201
F.3d 680 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding jury verdict in favor of defendants). Environmentalists in
West Virginia faced a massive libel action brought by coal companies unhappy with their efforts
to restrict mining activities. Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981) (holding that alleging
that petitioning activity is malicious will not always give rise to a cause of action). And libel
[Vol. 54:4
LESSONS FROM A STORY UNTOLD
Nike's New York Times argument also drew heavy fire from
Kasky and his amici on the ground that it would call into question
the constitutionality of state and federal consumer deception laws,
none of which embodies New York Times's heightened standard of
proof. For instance, the amici brief filed on behalf of California
and seventeen other states pointed out that
California, along with 43 other states and the District of Co-
lumbia has adopted a... false advertising statute that prohib-
its any person from disseminating untrue or misleading state-
ments which the person knows, or by the exercise of reason-
able care should know, to be untrue or misleading, with the
intent to dispose of property or services.' 19
These statutes would presumptively be unconstitutional at least
when applied to speech like Nike's as they permit the imposition
of fines and other sanctions on the basis of a showing that would
fall well short of that required by New York Times. The same is
true of federal laws proscribing false or deceptive commercial
speech. As the Solicitor General acknowledged in his amicus brief
supporting Nike,1 20 "[n]either the FTC Act, nor the postal statute,
nor the Lanham Act, requires, as a precondition to relief, a demon-
stration that the defendant had an intent to deceive." 12  Thus, a
ruling in Nike's favor on this point would call into question the
actions by land developers against critics of development are legion. See, e.g., Westfield Part-
ners v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523 (N.D. I1l. 1990) (dismissing action and collecting cases); Pro-
tect Our Mountain Env't v. Dist. Court, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984) (upholding dismissal of $40
million action by developer against local environmental group); see also Sierra Club v. Butz,
349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (dismissing $1 million counterclaim by logging company
against the Sierra Club in an action to restrict timber cutting activities in Northern California).
One of the earliest cases was Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper, Co., 417 F.
Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976) (dismissing a libel action brought against a newspaper, a small, pro-
gressive news service, and its reporter, for reporting that a defense contractor had held a "stag
party," and paid for prostitutes, to entertain Defense Department officials).
"9 Brief of Amici Curiae State of California et al. in Support of Respondent at 22, Nike
(No. 02-575) (citing, inter alia, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2000)).
120Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Nike (No. 02-575).
The Solicitor General supported reversal of the judgment below on the limited ground that Mr.
Kasky had no standing to bring an action implicating First Amendment rights because he did not
allege that he personally had been injured by Nike's false statements. Id. at 9-15. The Solicitor
General did not support Nike on the substantive issues in the case, which he urged the Court to
avoid. Id. at 24-30.
121 Id. at 16 n.7 (citations omitted). The provisions the Solicitor General referred to are 15
U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 52 (2000) (empowering the FTC to take action against unfair methods of com-
petition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce, including the dissemination of false advertising); 39 U.S.C. § 3005 (2000) (empowering
the Postal Service to proceed against false and fraudulent schemes that use the mail); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000) (providing for a civil action against any person who "in commercial
advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic
origin of his or her or another person's goods, services or commercial activities").
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constitutionality of the federal government's comprehensive
scheme for regulating and deterring false, deceptive, and mislead-
ing advertising.122  There is no reason to believe that the Court
would be willing to take such a far-reaching step that would jeop-
ardize long-standing state and federal enforcement authority.
123
C. Lesson Number Three: The Court Will Not Redefine the
Domain of Commercial Speech Along the Lines
Proposed by Nike and Its Allies
Nike's arguments about the breadth or domain of commercial
speech will at some point have to be revisited by the Court, if only
to clear up the confusion sown by the Nike litigation. After all, the
heart of Nike's argument was that its statements about its treat-
ment of its workforce fell outside of the boundaries of "commer-
cial speech" and therefore deserved to be treated as core speech
under the First Amendment. As is true in most cases as celebrated
and contentious as Nike v. Kasky, Nike had a fair point-context
122 See also Brief of Domini Social Investments LLC et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 27, Nike (No. 02-575) (contending that the Court's acceptance of Nike's New
York Times argument "would... render unconstitutional various sections of the Securities Act,
the Exchange Act and SEC rules").
123 Some participants in the Symposium stake out a middle-ground position, at least for
private plaintiff cases like Nike v. Kasky. They recognize that "the 'malice' standard offers too
much protection to false statements of fact for speech such as is at issue here, and thus threatens
to shortchange the interest in consumer protection." James Weinstein, Speech Categorization
and the Limits of First Amendment Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1091, 1138-40 (2004). In their view, "a more limited First Amendment immunity akin
to that provided under Gertz v. Welch seems in order. Under this standard, a plaintiff cannot
recover in a defamation action unless he can show that the defendant was at least negligent in
making the untrue statements, and, in addition, can prove that he was actually damaged by these
statements ..... Id. at 1139; see also Robert M. O'Neil, Nike v. Kasky-What Might Have
Been. . ., 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1259 (2004). Presumably, this approach would leave intact
the government's ability to restrain and punish false or deceptive commercial speech without a
showing of fault and to impose fines without a showing of actual damages. This attempt at an
accommodation, perhaps laudable from a doctrinal standpoint, raises a set of practical problems.
For one thing, it would construct a peculiar First Amendment rule-one that gives the govern-
ment a greater right to suppress or punish false speech than an individual has in private litiga-
tion. For another, applying the Gertz standard might result in precisely the kind of shortchang-
ing the interest in consumer protection the author fears. Consider a variant on Nike v. Kasky,
where the plaintiff bought Nike sneakers because of Nike's progressive labor practices and
threw the sneakers away as soon as she learned the "truth" about Nike's treatment of workers.
Under Gertz, even if the plaintiff wins, she is unlikely to recover anything more than the $75 or
so she spent on the sneakers. Gertz not only rules out presumed and punitive damages, but
limits recovery to injuries to "reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation,
and mental anguish and suffering"-injuries that may be compensable for a libel plaintiff, but
are unlikely to be compensable for a false advertising plaintiff. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 350 (1974). And if proof of detrimental reliance is required, as one would suppose
under Gertz, does that eliminate the possibility of class cases? If so, then, as a practical matter,
there is little difference for prospective plaintiffs between New York Times and Gertz, because,
in either event, the cases would be too hard to prove and the recoveries too modest to justify
litigation.
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should matter in assessing the application of the commercial
speech doctrine. A letter to the editor should not necessarily be
judged under the same standard as a direct-to-consumer advertise-
ment on television, and matters of constitutional importance
should not be resolved by resort to mere labels.
In response to these arguments, the Court is likely to reaffirm
that context must be taken into account when determining whether
speech is "commercial." Lost in the firestorm over Nike v. Kasky,
however, is the fact that the Court's long-standing test for com-
mercial speech is context-sensitive and sufficiently flexible to an-
swer many of Nike's context-dependent arguments. 24 An admoni-
tion by the Court will add clarity to this area of law. 125
But it is highly unlikely that the Court will reformulate the
definition of commercial speech along the lines proposed by Nike
and its allies. Make no mistake, Nike asked the Court to overhaul
substantially the line that it has historically applied to differentiate
commercial speech from other forms of protected expression.
Nike's argument broadly contends that speech is not "commercial"
124 Although the Court's test for commercial speech is generally summarized as speech
which "propose[s] a commercial transaction," see, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767
(1993), the Court elaborated a more nuanced test in Bolger. There, the Court identified three
characteristics that distinguish commercial from non-commercial speech: (1) whether the com-
munication is aimed at the speaker's customers; (2) whether the speech contains a promotional
message about the speaker's product; and (3) whether the speech is aimed at persuading con-
sumers to buy the speaker's product. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68
(1983). Under this test, context plainly matters. A letter to the editor that discussed Nike's
labor practices generally might not qualify as commercial speech while a direct-to-consumer
advertisement about Nike's newest sneaker plainly would. Applying these factors, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court found that the Nike statements at issue in this case constituted commercial
speech, and thus, if false, could form the basis of Mr. Kasky's claims under California's false
advertising and unfair competition laws. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 256-60 (Cal. 2002),
cert. dismissed, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).
125Te Court has long recognized that the line between commercial and noncommercial
speech is not a bright one. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,
637 (1985) ("precise bounds of the category of expression that may be termed commercial
speech" often hard to discern); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978) (line "will not al-
ways be easy to draw"); Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court,
68 CAL. L. REv. 422, 461 (1980) ("[lIt is not easy to define commercial speech or distinguish it
from noncommercial speech for first amendment purposes. But the task does not seem impossi-
ble."). The problem of line-drawing is not unique to commercial speech; indeed, it permeates
First Amendment jurisprudence, which carves out domains based on categories-obscenity,
fighting words, public forum, and so forth. In some instances, categorization determines
whether speech receives First Amendment protection at all (political speech does, obscenity
does not); in other instances, categorization defines the degree of First Amendment protection
speech warrants (political speech deserves the most stringent protection, commercial speech
something less). Once the Court undertakes categorization, line-drawing is inevitable. The
line-drawing problems the Court has faced with commercial speech are no different from those
encountered in other areas of the First Amendment. See generally Frederick Schauer, Catego-
ries and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv. 265 (1981); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Post-liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L.
REv. 293 (1992).
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unless it is both aimed directly at potential purchasers and ad-
dresses the characteristics of Nike's products, including the prod-
uct's price, quality, appearance, and safety, but nothing more.
126
Speech relating to moral and political matters, even if linked to a
product or aimed at consumers, is not "commercial," Nike main-
tains, because it "affects purchasing choices only secondarily, if at
all" and is "concerned with moral judgments that only indirectly
affect consumer behavior," for "only a subset of listeners.' 21 Un-
der Nike's proposed test, Nike's letters to college athletic directors
and newspaper advertisements defending its labor practices are not
commercial speech because they focus not on Nike's products, but
on Nike's corporate conduct.
It is hard to imagine the Court accepting Nike's redefinition
of commercial speech. To begin with, the Court has repeatedly
rejected similar arguments in the past. Anticipating precisely this
kind of attack, the Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy28
acknowledged that, at times, there might be a convergence of com-
mercial speech and core speech on important social matters, giving
as examples advertising for legal abortions, promotion of artificial
furs as an alternative to the extinction of fur-bearing animals, and
advertisements by domestic producers urging that consumers buy
their products as an alternative to imports that deprive U.S. resi-
dents of their jobs. 129 These communications, the Court made
clear, were nonetheless to be judged under the commercial speech
test even though they also addressed important political and social
matters. 30 The Court repeated this point in Central Hudson, rec-
ognizing that "many, if not most, products may be tied to public
concerns about the environment, energy, economic policy, or indi-
vidual health and safety" and that a linkage between a product and
a matter of public debate does not transform commercial speech
into core speech. 3' The Court reiterated this view in Bolger,
where it addressed the constitutional status of pamphlets distrib-
uted by a condom manufacturer which, along with promoting the
product, contained a discussion about the value of condoms in
halting the spread of venereal disease. Finding that the pamphlets
were commercial rather than core speech, the Court emphasized
126 Brief for the Petitioners Nike, Inc., et. al. at 16, Nike (No. 02-575); see also id. at 26-28.
27Id. at 19, 36, 46.
128 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
129 Id. at 764-65.
'3 Id. at 765.
131 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 n.5
(1980).
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that the pamphlets were advertisements, that they referred to a par-
ticular product, and that they were economically motivated, thus
subjecting them to review under the commercial speech stan-
dard.
132
While the line drawn by Bolger is hardly seamless, it has
worked tolerably well for two decades. Indeed, in the twenty years
between Bolger and Nike, no case before the Court turned on the
definitional question. The line-drawing test proposed by Nike,
apart from being novel, would dramatically reshape the landscape
of commercial speech law on the basis of highly indeterminate and
subjective judgments. Under Nike's definition, a wide array of
statements could be characterized as "moral" or "political," even
though they plainly drive consumer choice. Statements about
whether food is kosher, whether produce is organic, whether tuna
is dolphin-safe, and whether cosmetics have been produced with-
out animal testing, could all, under Nike's theory, fall outside the
definition of commercial speech, even though the government
regulates such claims for accuracy. 133 So too might statements by
corporations about matters relating to executive compensation, the
likelihood that a drug company's product will be approved by the
FDA, or predictions about the fate of a new product. 134 Statements
of this sort, of course, have long been regulated by the SEC and
the FDA. 35 The briefs by Nike's opponents are replete with other,
equally compelling, examples of claims that could, applying
Nike's definition, fall outside of the line, notwithstanding the fact
that they are at the forefront of consumer concerns and are pres-
ently the subject of government regulation.1 36 For all of these rea-
sons, it is likely that the Court would see Nike's definitional argu-
ment for what it is-an effort to promote the substantial deregula-
tion of corporate speech.
132 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-68 (1983).
13 3 See Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent by Members of the United States
Congress at 2, 10-14, Nike (No. 02-575).
'3See Press Release, FDA, FDA and SEC Work to Enhance Public's Protection from
False and Misleading Statements (Feb. 5, 2004) (announcing cooperative program between the
FDA and SEC to enable SEC to investigate claims that FDA-regulated firms have made state-
ments material to the firm's financial condition that may be false or misleading), available at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2004/NEW01019.html.
135 id.
136 See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent by Members of the United
States Congress at 2-3, 10-14, Nike (No. 02-575) (discussing consumer concerns relating to
kosher food, unionized labor, and product testing practices); Brief of Amicus Curiae Public
Citizen at 22-25, Nike (No. 02-575) (noting consumers' concern for environmentally conscious
products and "Made in the USA" labeling); Brief of Domini Social Investments LLC et. al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4-5, Nike (No. 02-575) (noting airline maintenance
and safety as an example).
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The final, albeit related, problem with Nike's definitional ar-
gument is that it begs the question of the constitutional status of
"image" advertising. As students of modern advertising point out,
today's mass media advertising has little to do with "information"
and almost everything to do with "image."1 37 Image advertising
focuses not on a corporation's product, but the corporation's iden-
tity, or, more precisely, the identity the corporation wants to pro-
ject to the public. 138 We are told that young people comprise "the
Pepsi generation," having a Mastercard is "priceless," that "At
Ford, Quality is Job #1," and that Nike wants us to "Just Do It."
Nike's advertisements do not communicate information about the
price, durability, or availability of its products. Rather, they "con-
vey[] the idea that Nike sneakers [a]re worn by people of all ages,
genders, and disabilities, and that the buyers of Nike shoes ha[ve]
the grit and determination to take on the type of challenges in-
cluded in the advertisement[] . . . 'the roads are always open. Just
do it.' Wearing Nikes offer[s] a route to spiritual if not political
salvation.. ,,139 As one expert put it, Nike's advertising suggests
that buying Nike products is "part of expressing who you are, what
you stand for and what you believe in."'14 Nike itself said that the
statements at issue were intended to demonstrate that Nike is "a
good corporate citizen." 141 Having carefully cultivated Nike's im-
age as a fair-minded, "good corporate citizen," Nike nonetheless
argued that statements that go to the heart of that image-whether
Nike treats its workers humanely-should be immune from chal-
lenge because they concern moral and not commercial matters.
Nike's problem here is one of its own making. Having chosen
image advertising as its preferred way of communicating with con-
sumers, Nike cannot seriously contend that matters that define
Nike's image are not "commercial" in the most basic sense. 142 On
this point, Nike's arguments about context undercut its line-
drawing argument as well. If context is important to properly
137 See Ronald K. L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEX.
L. REv. 697, 708 (1993) (noting advertisers' concern with image and illusion more than prod-
uct).
138 Id.
13 RANDY SHAW, RECLAIMING AMERICA: NIKE, CLEAN AIR, AND THE NEW NATIONAL
ACrivISM 17 (1999).
140 Steve Suo, Nike Takes Own Advice in Changing Its Slogan, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Jan. 4, 1998, at Al, available at 1998 WL 4171086 (quoting Lynn Khale, head of the marketing
program at the University of Oregon).
141 Brief for the Petitioners at (i), Nike (No. 02-575).
142 Nike's own CEO, Phil Knight, admitted as much in 1998, when he acknowledged that
"I truly believe the American consumer doesn't want to buy products made under abusive con-
ditions." Bill Richards, Nike to Increase Minimum Age in Asia for New Hirings, Improve Air
Quality, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1998, at B10.
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categorizing speech, then it must be understood that Nike's state-
ments at issue in Nike v. Kasky were not made in the course of a
debating society discussion over labor practices in Asia. They
were made because a consumer boycott of Nike products in the
late 1990s delivered a body blow to Nike's bottom line. Nike lost
money in 1998 for the first time in thirteen years and had to lay off
2,000 workers. 43 Nike's statements were made to stop the flood
of consumer defections by demonstrating that Nike is, in fact, the
"good corporate citizen" it claims to be. No speech was more cen-
tral to Nike's economic well-being than the statements at issue in
Nike v. Kasky.
For these reasons, it is unlikely that the Court will adopt
Nike's view that only communications directed to consumers that
make representations about specific products qualify as commer-
cial speech. The consequences of such an approach would be far-
reaching. If one accepts Nike's basic proposition that the com-
mercial speech doctrine applies only to direct-to-consumer ads and
little else, then one must accept the necessary corollary to Nike's
argument-that commercial speakers may not be compelled to ac-
count for the accuracy of much of their speech in court or by gov-
ernment regulators, absent the most extraordinary circumstances.
The Court is unlikely to accept such a significant reformulation of
the definition of commercial speech.
CONCLUSION
Extracting lessons from a case not decided is undoubtedly an
exercise fraught with uncertainty. There is no way to know
whether the concerns that drove the Court to accept review in Nike
will animate the Court in future cases. Nor is it assured that, hav-
ing carefully considered Nike, the Court will be anxious to review
the next case that presents the same questions.
But one thing is certain: The commercial speech doctrine re-
mains a controversial doctrine in considerable flux. As one First
Amendment authority recently remarked, commercial speech is "a
notoriously unstable and contentious domain of First Amendment
143 As one report put it:
Some of the most admired and powerful brand advertising was tainted when ...
[Nike] became embroiled in the Asian sweatshop scandal. The brand that could
seemingly do no wrong was suddenly the target of a violent backlash, particularly on
the intemet, where a Boycott Nike website became the focus of activity. The effects
of the PR disaster on Nike were dramatic. In 1998 it made losses for the first time in
13 years and was forced to cut almost 2,000 jobs.
James Curtis, Public Relations: PR Takes Center Stage, CAMPAIGN, Mar. 10, 2000, available at
2000 WL 9853049.
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jurisprudence. No other realm of First Amendment law has proved
as divisive." 144  For that reason, courts will continue to be pre-
sented with inventive arguments, like those raised by Nike, seek-
ing to broaden First Amendment protection to speech the govern-
ment labels "commercial," and the courts will have to address
those arguments.
Without guidance from the Court in Nike, we are left to pre-
dict the direction the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine
will take. Nike presents the dilemma of a story untold. Like an
audience permitted to see only the first three acts of a four-act
play, the audience in Nike was left to imagine its own ending.
Perhaps it is best that the Court chose not to write Nike's final act.
After all, the case presented "difficult First Amendment ques-
tions,"1 45 the record before the Court was threadbare, the Court had
little time to deliberate,"46 and the Court's dismissal led to the
quick resolution of the case on terms both parties found accept-
able. 147
This Article imagines one conclusion to Nike-that the Court
would have been hesitant to engage in the sort of wholesale revi-
sion of the doctrine Nike urged. The basic truth about the com-
mercial speech doctrine is that it was crafted as a pragmatic solu-
tion to the complicated problem of how to open the door to truthful
communications between sellers and prospective purchasers while
continuing to shield prospective purchasers from falsehoods and
half-truths that distort the market. The test that has evolved to
evaluate restraints on commercial speech, the modem Central
Hudson test, has not served that goal perfectly, but has served it
reasonably well-so much so that the doctrine is criticized far
more for its theoretical failings than for the results it produces.
While the doctrine may be "notoriously unstable and contentious,"
the results it produces are generally predictable and broadly ap-
'4 Post, supra note 89, at 2.
145Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. at 2558 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 2560 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
'46The timing of Nike might have been a problem for the Court. The Court granted Nike's
petition for a writ of certiorari on January 10, 2003. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 817 (2003).
Nike was argued just three months later on April 23, 2003, the final argument day of the 2002
Term, and was dismissed on June 26, 2003, the final day the Court issued opinions from the
2002 Term. Thus, had the Court reached the merits, it would have had just two months from the
date of argument to consider and decide the case, leaving little time for the circulation of draft
opinions and deliberation within the Court.
47 David F. Pike, Activist Lawyer Questions Nike Pact on Labor: Letters by Attorney De-
mand Whole Story, Details of Settlement, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 26, 2003, at 1 (quoting Kasky's
lawyer as saying that "Mr. Kasky is satisfied that this settlement reflects Nike's commitment to
positive change where factory workers are concerned," and Nike's director for global issues
management as saying that the settlement "benefits a wide array of people").
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proved. Aside from the Court's acknowledged mistake in Posa-
das, few of the Court's commercial speech decisions have drawn
fire because of their results. For this reason, although the Court
will continue to tinker with the commercial speech doctrine at the
margins, it is not likely to abandon the doctrine's central value of
encouraging the free flow of truthful-and only truthful-
commercial information to consumers to enable informed decision-
making.
Postscript-A Brief Response to Collins and Skover
In an effort to sort out the authors' positions on the key ques-
tions raised by Nike v. Kasky, Collins and Skover present four hy-
pothetical cases and then speculate how each author might resolve
them.148 Because Collins and Skover's speculation about how I
would analyze the cases is only partly correct, I want to set the
record straight.
As Collins and Skover predict, for me, the final two of the
case illustrations are easy because they build on the facts of Nike v.
Kasky but add important context that further undermines Nike's
First Amendment defense. In one case, Nike makes specific repre-
sentations about the working conditions in foreign factories at a
shareholders' meeting; in the other, Nike makes the same represen-
tations to an assembly of college athletic coaches who have "in-
formed Nike that they would no longer purchase its products ab-
sent clear assurances that the workers were neither underpaid nor
physically abused." In my view, a First Amendment defense by
Nike would fail. Nike recognized that, even if the Court reshaped
the commercial speech doctrine along the lines it urged, the First
Amendment would not shield a company from liability for making
false claims about a company's product directly to consumers.
After all, Nike's plea to the U.S. Supreme Court was that the Court
should fashion a commercial speech test that was affirmatively
context-specific.149 In one hypothetical, Nike is making inaccurate
claims to appease angry customers; in the other, it is making inac-
curate claims to influence investors. And in both cases, Nike's
concessions about context would be its undoing. 150
148 Ronald L.K. Collins & David M. Skover, Foreword, The Landmark Free-Speech Case
that Wasn't: The Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 965, 1031-39 & nn.299-301
(2004).
149 Brief of the Petitioners at 22-26, Nike (No. 02-575).
150 Id. at 34 n.9 (conceding that under the securities laws, and other "special regulatory re-
gime[s]," strict regulation of corporate speech would not run afoul of the First Amendment).
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As to the other two examples, Collins and Skover are only
half right about my views. In one hypothetical, Nike joins a vio-
lence-against-women campaign and some unspecified time thereaf-
ter is charged by an "anti-corporate activist group" of "knowingly
tolerat[ing] abuses against women in its foreign factories." In the
second case, Phil Knight, Nike's CEO, goes on a popular televi-
sion show and says that Nike "is committed to being Green."
Some time later (again unspecified), an investigative reporter re-
veals that a Nike plant in Taiwan has polluted the local water sup-
ply. Collins and Skover speculate that I would find the "'being
Green' scenario a candidate for free speech protection, if only be-
cause Phil Knight's statement is arguably not specific enough to
trigger any real consumer reliance."1 51 I agree that the "being
Green" scenario would not present Nike opponents with a viable
lawsuit. But I base that conclusion not just on the lack of specific-
ity in Phil Knight's comments, but also because this hypothetical,
like the violence-against-women hypothetical, lacks the rich con-
text that made Nike v. Kasky, and the two hypothetical cases build-
ing on Nike v. Kasky, not just viable, but winnable, cases.
The problem with these two hypothetical cases is that there is
no clear connection between the company's statements and the
misdeeds the company is accused of committing. In this respect,
these hypothetical cases depart markedly from the real Nike v.
Kasky, which arose because activists threw down the gauntlet to
Nike on the company's foreign labor practices and Nike picked it
up. There was no question in Nike that the company's statements
about its labor practices were made in direct response to the
charges that had been laid against the company.152 Had Collins
and Skover wanted their examples to parallel Nike v. Kasky, the
company's statements in support of environmental protection and
safeguarding the rights of female workers would have been made
in response to, not before, allegations of misconduct. Here is
where I draw the line. As a litigator, I would take neither the "be-
ing Green" nor the "violence-against-women" case, based on the
skeletal facts we have been given, because proving that the state-
ments were not accurate when made would be too hard, if not im-
possible. Thus, in both cases, I think that the company might have
a solid First Amendment defense based on truth. The "violence-
against-women" case is problematic for another reason: Nike's
statement is not clearly a statement of its own practices, in stark
" Collins & Skover, supra note 148, at 1037.
152 See, e.g., Brief of the Petitioners at 40-42, Nike (No. 02-575); Brief for the National As-
sociation of Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Nike (No. 02-575).
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contrast to Nike's actual statements about how it treated its foreign
workers. And the "being Green" scenario is a difficult one to liti-
gate because saying that a company is "committed to being Green"
(not that the company is Green) may be more a statement of aspi-
ration than one of fact, and may not be actionable for that reason
as well. Thus, I think that the First Amendment is stronger medi-
cine than perhaps Collins and Skover recognize, not because it
protects falsehoods, but because these hypothetical cases do not
involve the kind of clear-cut misstatements of fact at issue in Nike
v. Kasky.

